By Tim Corthaut
Book review: S. Vogenauer and S. Weatherill (eds.), General Principles of Law – European and Comparative Perspectives, Hart, 2017, 418 p.
The book is a collection of articles that reflect the outcome of a two-day seminar organised by the Oxford Law Faculty’s Institute of European and Comparative Law in 2015 on general principles of law. As often with collective works the result is a mixed bag with articles jumping in various directions, dealing with international law, EU law, private law and comparative law; some take a bird’s eye view on the legal landscape or the history of European integration, others focus on very specific issues, such as discrimination on the grounds of obesity. All authors, however, have clearly something to tell.
The book starts off with a brief introduction, as is customary for a collective work, but quickly cuts to the chase. The first two substantive chapters contrast the use of general principles in international law through a pleasant overview by Catherine Redgewell and in EU law with a most enjoyable essay by one of the editors, Stephen Weatherill. Continue reading
By Oliver Garner
On the day that Theresa May declared that withdrawal negotiations between the United Kingdom and the European Union have reached an impasse, the Inner House of the Court of Session in Scotland issued a judgment that may pave the road for a third option between no deal and May’s imperilled Chequers deal. The Scottish court decided to refer the following question in a preliminary reference to the Court of Justice of the European Union:
‘Where, in accordance with Article 50 of the TEU, a Member State has notified the European Council of its intention to withdraw from the European Union, does EU law permit that notice to be revoked unilaterally by the notifying Member State; and, if so, subject to what conditions and with what effect relative to the Member State remaining within the EU’.
The purpose of the reference is to clarify for Members of Parliament whether it would be a legally valid option under Section 13 of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act to withhold a resolution approving any negotiated withdrawal agreement, or lack thereof, and instead vote to revoke notification under Article 50(2).
This post will summarise the reasoning of the Court of Session judgment. It will then engage with the arguments for and against the proposition that notice under Article 50(2) may indeed be revoked unilaterally. The argument will be forwarded that such a unilateral revocation by the United Kingdom should be possible, so long as a decision is made to do so in accordance with the constitutional requirements of the Member State. The post will conclude with consideration of the second limb of the conditions and effects of such a revocation for the Member State remaining within the EU. If unilateral revocation is indeed possible, it will be argued that the most desirable method of creating such a statutory power would be to include it within legislation mandating the holding of a second referendum on the question of whether the United Kingdom should leave or remain within the European Union, and to predicate its operation thereupon. Continue reading
By Christopher Harding
Thinking about the whole legal saga arising from Romano Pisciotti’s involvement in the Marine Hose Cartel, discussed recently on this blog by J. Przerwa, triggers some thoughts about how much depends on circumstance and happenstance. This is relevant to the claims often made by enforcers and lawyers regarding the deterrent effect of severe sanctions (in particular the ‘inferno’ of prison terms in the US), of dedicated enforcement efforts (in particular on the part of the US Department of Justice), and of the possibility of extradition to the US (as in Pisciotti’s case). ‘From Hollywood to Hong Kong – criminal antitrust enforcement is coming to a city near you,’ warned Scott D Hammond of the DoJ in 2002. Maybe so. But aficionados of deterrence theory should remember that in this world much depends on circumstance and happenstance.
For instance, there is the happenstance of double criminality as a basis for extradition, and that still varies among European jurisdictions in relation to the criminality of cartel offending. If Pisciotti had changed flights at Amsterdam Schiphol Airport rather than Frankfurt Airport, there would have been a crucial criminal law difference – no possibility of extradition. Moreover, Pisciotti was unaware that he was at risk, having been indicted in the US ‘under seal,’ so that he blithely disembarked at Frankfurt Airport. Then there is the happenstance of court jurisdictions, the Landgericht in Berlin seemingly more willing to raise questions with the European Court of Justice than the Bundesverfassungsgericht. And then there is the circumstance that Pisciotti’s state of nationality, Italy, appeared disinterested or unwilling to take over the legal process and possibly save its national from the ‘inferno’ of an American correctional institution.
In sum, many elements along the road may remain unpredictable or variable, while arguably there are still arguments to be played out at the EU legal level that the variability of legal position across the EU may fall foul of non-discrimination and free movement rules. Even if Pisciotti brings no further claims, this may not be the end of the legal saga, especially in the circumstance of determinedly litigious cartelists such as Romano Pisciotti or Ian Norris, a former UK executive of Morgan Crucible who underwent a somewhat similar fate: his extradition to the US was first refused by the House of Lords on grounds of price-fixing but the DoJ eventually succeeded on the basis of obstruction of justice charges (see for instance here). Let’s hope this case law will also stimulate some further reflection on the underlying deterrence logic of cartel enforcement and the long road ahead to make detection, prosecution and enforcement of sentences more predictable across Europe.
For a fuller discussion of some of these issues, there is a page on the Christopher Harding web site: www.Christopher-Harding.info.
By Sofia Mirandola
The case and questions referred
In these times when “strong headwinds” are blowing against the European culture of fundamental rights and the rule of law (see P. Pinto de Albuquerque), the principles of mutual recognition and mutual trust on which judicial cooperation in the EU is based have come under pressure. The CJEU and the ECtHR are increasingly called upon to address the phenomenon of “rule of law backsliding” and to strongly defend these common values.
The recent preliminary reference submitted by the High Court of Ireland in case C-216/18 L.M. fits into such trend. It concerns the possibility to refuse the execution of three European Arrest Warrants issued by Polish courts against an individual, L.M., on account of the potential violation of the right to a fair trial ensuing from the latest controversial reforms of the judiciary in Poland. According to the Commission’s reasoned proposal to activate for the first time in history the procedure of Art. 7 TEU, which recently found the endorsement of the European Parliament calling on the Council to take action swiftly, the said reforms resulted in a breach of the rule of law due to, essentially, a lack of sufficient guarantees of external independence of the judiciary at all levels. Even though the application of the Framework Decision on the EAW can be suspended only after a Council’s decision under Art. 7 (1) TEU has been adopted (Recital 10 of the Framework Decision on the EAW), it is nonetheless inevitable that such circumstances may – from the viewpoint of the person subject to an EAW issued by Poland – entail a serious risk of breach of the right to a fair trial. The CJEU now has thus the opportunity to clarify whether an alleged lack of judicial independence amounts to a breach of the right to a fair trial that calls for the refusal to execute an EAW, as an exception to the principle of mutual trust.
By Alina Tryfonidou
In its much-awaited judgment in Coman, delivered earlier this month, the Court of Justice ruled that the term ‘spouse’ for the purpose of the grant of family reunification rights under EU free movement law, includes the same-sex spouse of a Union citizen who has moved between Member States. This means that in such situations, the Union citizen can require the State of destination to admit within its territory his/her same-sex spouse, irrespective of whether that State has opened marriage to same-sex couples within its territory.
This is a landmark ruling of great constitutional importance which has the potential of changing the legal landscape for the recognition of same-sex relationships within the EU. It is, also, a judgment which is hugely significant at a symbolic level, as through it the EU’s supreme court made it clear that it considers same-sex marriages as equal to opposite-sex marriages, in this way reversing the discriminatory stance it had adopted in the early 00’s, when it ruled in D and Sweden v. Council that ‘[i]t is not in question that, according to the definition generally accepted by the Member States, the term marriage means a union between two persons of the opposite sex’.
Workshop “Constructing Legal Orders in Europe: The General Principles of EU Law”
University of Leicester, 29-30 June 2018. (Free) registration necessary.
Conference “EU external relations: Tackling global challenges?”
TMC Asser Institute, 6-7 December 2018. Deadline for abstract submissions: 30 June 2018.
Call for Papers “EuConst Colloquium 2018”
Amsterdam, 5 October 2018. Deadline for abstract submissions: 1 July 2018.
Conference “Waiting for Brexit: Open issues in the Internal Market and in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice”
University of Milan-Bicocca, 19 October 2018. Deadline for abstract submissions: 15 July 2018.
Conference “Religion and Ethnicity on the International Bench”
University of Oslo, 4-5 October 2018. Deadline for abstract submissions: 18 July 2018.
PhD Seminar “The External Dimension of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice”
University of Luxembourg, 25-26 October 2018. Deadline for submissions: 5 September 2018.
Call for Papers “The Visegrád Group”
Anglo-American University Law Review. Deadline for submissions: 1 October 2018.
By Uladzislau Belavusau
In the recent years the Court of Justice of the European Union, has pronounced twice about physical requirements as a matter of discrimination. The first case – Kaltoft (C-354/13) – concerned obesity and was briefly annotated on European Law Blog. The present commentary will look into another case from the Union’s Court – Kalliri (C-409/16) – this time regarding discrimination based on height requirements. While it is usually excessive rather than low weight that causes discrimination, height entails a contrary correlation. By now, rich studies about stature in psychology and sociology unequivocally show that shorter people are more likely to face discrimination than their taller compatriots, with employment patterns often imitating biological dispositions about size amongst animals. Social hierarchies are, thus, clearly height-bound, permeating our public image, wages, choice of work partners and even success of presidential candidates.
What the present case of Kalliri (2017) illustrates in addition is that the stigma of short stature in employment has particular repercussions for women. Ms. Maria-Eleni Kalliri brought a complaint in front of the administrative court in Greece regarding the rejection of her application for police training due to insufficient height. The default height requirement for such applicants under Greek rules was 170 centimeters for both men and women. Ms. Kalliri fell short of this criterion by 2 centimeters and therefore complained that her dismissal was a matter of gender discrimination, since men are on average more likely to satisfy this requirement. While the lower tribunal found this to be discrimination, a higher Greek court requested a preliminary ruling from the Luxembourg court on whether the height requirement indeed constitutes sex discrimination under EU law. Continue reading
By Sarah Progin-Theuerkauf
On 8 May 2018, with the judgment in K.A. and others vs. Belgium, the Court of Justice of the European Union (ECJ) has added another piece to the now quite big puzzle that surrounds the legal status of EU citizens (and their third country family members). It ruled that Article 20 TFEU can be violated if a Member State refuses to examine a request for family reunification of a EU citizen with a third country national solely on the basis of an existing entry ban against the third country national. The Court argued that if the refusal compels the EU citizen to leave the territory of the EU as a whole, it deprives EU citizens of the genuine enjoyment of the substance of the rights conferred by virtue of their status. Like in the Zambrano case, the EU citizens in K.A. had never exercised their right to free movement.
Just a quick reminder of the Court’s main findings in Zambrano: In that case, Belgium had denied a right of residence to a Colombian father of two Belgian minors. The Court held that, by not giving the father of a Belgian child a derived residence right, Belgium will oblige the child to leave the territory of the EU as a whole, and therefore deprive the child of the genuine enjoyment of the substance of the rights’ conferred by the EU citizenship status. It was argued – and here is the revolutionary aspect – that this even applies in purely internal situations, e.g. where the EU citizen has never exercised his or her right to free movement. Normally, EU law only applies in situations with a cross-border element. Continue reading
By Eleni Frantziou
In its recent ruling in Egenberger (C-414/16), the Court’s Grand Chamber has redrawn the boundaries of a constitutional problem German courts are rather familiar with: the horizontal application of the right not to be discriminated against in situations coming within the scope of EU law. The case raises two important constitutional issues: firstly, whether the horizontal effect of EU fundamental rights must be direct; and, secondly, how the balance between conflicting fundamental rights should be reached in a private dispute. This post argues that, on the one hand, in Egenberger,the Court offers a methodologically more principled account of the horizontal effect of fundamental rights than its case law has provided to date. On the other hand, its approach towards the balance between religious freedom and non-discrimination is problematic because it does not offer the degree of clarity and guidance that is needed to accommodate horizontal conflicts of rights under the Charter framework. Continue reading
Conference “Sovereigns and citizens in the Brexit bargain: Do rights count?” (Prof. Takis Tridimas)
Université de Liège, Amphithéâtre Portalis, 23 April 2018 (15:30-16:30).
Summer School “Parliamentary Accountability and New Technologies: Transparency, Privacy and Security Challenges”
LUISS Guido Carli University, Rome, 9-20 July 2018. Deadline for applications: 29 April 2018.
Call for papers: Edited Volume “Legal Impact Assessment of Brexit”
Deadline for submissions: 9 May 2018.
Workshop “The International Legality of Economic Activities in Occupied Territories”
T.M.C. Asser Institute, The Hague, 17 October 2018. Deadline for abstract submissions: 15 May 2018.
Conference “Procedural rights in criminal proceedings in the EU”
Universities of Utrecht, Leiden and Maastricht, 13-14 September 2018. Deadline for applications: 15 May 2018.
Conference “Human Rights Laws at a Crossroads: What Directions after Brexit?”
University of Leicester, 25 May 2018. (Free) registration necessary.
Workshop “Constitutional Protection of Minorities – Comparing Concepts, Models and Experiences in Asia and in Europe”
University of Trento, 4-5 May 2018. Registration necessary.
Summer School “Comparing Constitutional Adjudication – Islam in Constitutional Adjudication in Europe”
Dimaro, Italy, 30 July-3 August 2018. Deadline for applications: 26 April 2018.
Seminar “The Western Sahara Campaign Case”
Queen Mary University of London, 3 May 2018. Registration necessary.
By Giovanni Zaccaroni and Francesco Rossi
Many valuable contributions have been written (for example this blog post but also elsewhere, among many others) on the M.A.S. decision (M.A.S. and M.B., case C-42/17 a.k.a. Taricco II) and, more in general, on the Taricco saga. The majority of them, however, focus mainly on the criminal and constitutional law dimensions separately. In this contribution, we focus on these dimensions together: we believe that this decision is equally important for the relationship between the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) and the national Constitutional Courts as it is for the hazardous path of a harmonization of the general part of criminal law at EU level.
The reason why these two dimensions are usually examined separately lies on the different background of the scholars concerned. In this blogpost we have done the effort to put together and explain the importance of the M.A.S. decision from the viewpoint of a criminal lawyer and from the one of a (European) constitutional lawyer. To do that, this work will be divided in two main parts: we will firstly look at the relationship between the CJEU and the Italian Constitutional Court (ICC) (in the first part, sections I and II, written by Giovanni Zaccaroni). We will then see whether and how the decision advances the harmonization of criminal law at an EU level (the second part, sections III-V, written by Francesco Rossi). Continue reading
By Johannes Graf von Luckner
From North to South, from national governments to the Commission: EU Institutions and Member States are in agreement that a reform of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) is high on the political agenda. One aspect of such a reform is the integration of the Fiscal Compact into the EU legal framework, which the Member States committed to in the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union (TSCG). With a French Government that is pushing for reforms, a German government that is finally in place, and a proposal for a directive drafted by the EU Commission on the table, it is likely that the topic will gain importance.
In three somewhat distinct steps, this post aims to explain the obligation to incorporate the Fiscal Compact into EU law (1.), explore one viable option to do so, which some of the treaty-drafters might have had in mind, namely the Enhanced Cooperation mechanism (2.), and analyse the (rather surprising) Commission proposal on the topic (3.). Continue reading
By Anne-Carlijn Prickartz and Sandra Hummelbrunner
This February, the Court of Justice of the European Union delivered a judgment in which, one year after the C-104/16 P Council v Front Polisario judgment, once more the EU’s trade relations with Morocco took centre stage. Whereas in Front Polisario the Court was faced with the question of the validity of the EU-Morocco Association Agreement (AA) and Liberalisation Agreement (LA), this time the Court was tasked with determining the validity of the EU-Morocco Fisheries Partnership Agreement (FPA), the 2013 Protocol thereto and the EU implementing acts in the context of a preliminary ruling procedure requested by the British High Court. The national proceedings were brought by the voluntary organization Western Sahara Campaign UK, which sought to challenge certain British policies and practices implementing the aforementioned legal acts, as far as they pertained to goods originating in and fisheries policy related to Western Sahara. As in Front Polisario, the main issue was the application of these agreements to the territory of and products originating in Western Sahara, a non-self-governing territory to be decolonised in accordance with the principle of self-determination, but considered by Morocco to be an integral part of its sovereign territory (for background, see our Article on T-512/12 Front Polisario v Council).
Given that this is the first request for a preliminary reference concerning the validity of international agreements concluded by the EU and their acts of conclusion, it also raised some new procedural questions, especially concerning the Court’s jurisdiction. In this case, the Court readily accepted that it has jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings on the interpretation and validity of all EU acts, ‘without exception’. This is noteworthy in and of itself, as it firmly establishes the Court’s jurisdiction when it comes to reviewing the EU’s international agreements in light of international law, albeit indirectly in the context of ruling on the validity of the EU act approving the international agreement in question (Judgment paras 48-51). Such jurisdiction is in line with the Court’s recent case-law that provides for the Court’s comprehensive jurisdiction, especially in light of the Court’s finding that the Treaties have created a ‘complete system’ of judicial review entrusted to the Courts of the EU (Rosneft para 66). Continue reading
By Harm Schepel
Investment Tribunals called upon to resolve intra-EU disputes are getting used to the European Commission showing up at their doorstep to try to convince them to decline jurisdiction. Though the range of arguments is wide and varied depending on the circumstances of the case and the underlying Investment Treaties, the overarching theme is simply that EU Law reigns supreme in relations between Member States and overrides all international law commitments that individual Member States- and the EU itself in the case of the Energy Charter Treaty- have entered into. The Commission has occasionally met with success: in Electrabel, a long learned discussion on the relationship between EU Law and the ECT was concluded with the bombshell that EU law ‘would prevail over the ECT in case of any material inconsistency’ (para. 4.191). Other times, it is summarily dismissed. ‘Should it ever be determined that there existed an inconsistency between the ECT and EU Law’, observed the Tribunal in RREEF Infrastructure, ‘the unqualified obligation in public international law of any arbitration tribunal constituted under the ECT would be to apply the former. This would be the case even were this to be the source of possible detriment to EU law. EU law does not and cannot “trump” public international law.’[i]
The most interesting point about these wide divergences between different Tribunals on rather fundamental points of EU and international law is how little they seem to matter. In both RREEF and Electrabel and numerous other intra-EU cases, the Tribunals disposed of the matter by pointing out that, in casu, there was no relevant material inconsistency, no conflict, no need to rule on matters of EU law, no incompatibility of obligations under different Treaties, and/or nothing that could not be solved by ‘harmonious interpretation.’ It might make sense to think of this Tribunal practice as devising conflicts-rules.
There are good reasons for the Court of Justice not to want to play this game. A case by case analysis of whether a particular award passes muster through national enforcement proceedings, or a Treaty-by-Treaty analysis of whether a particular dispute settlement or applicable law clause is compatible with EU law, is bound to be time consuming and labor-intensive, and will inevitably be unpredictable and lead to legal uncertainty. Continue reading
Conference “The Future of the EU and European Law”
Palacký University, Olomouc, 19-20 April 2018. Deadline for registration: 29 March 2018.
Conference “Law-Making in Multi-Level Settings – Federalism, Europe, and Beyond”
University of Antwerp, 20-21 September 2018. Deadline for abstract submissions: 9 April 2018.
Call for papers “European Junior Faculty Forum”
European University Institute, 12-13 July 2018. Deadline for paper submissions: 1 May 2018.
Conference “Brussels, We Have a Problem – Rethinking Justice Within the European Union”
University of Witten/Herdecke, 8-10 June 2018. No deadline for registration.
Summer School “Cinema Human Rights and Advocacy”
Venice, 27 August-5 September 2018. Deadline for registration: 20 June 2018.
By Pekka Niemelä
A week has passed since the European Court of Justice (ECJ) rendered the landmark Achmea judgment. A number of posts analyzing the judgment have already appeared in the legal blogosphere (see e.g. here, here, here and here). Much of this commentary has focused on describing the Court’s reasoning and on analyzing the judgment’s broader implications. Most commentators agree that there was nothing unexpected in the Court’s conclusion that the arbitration clauses in the less than two hundred intra-EU BITs have, as the Court put it, an ‘adverse effect on the autonomy of EU law’ (para. 59).
The judgment’s reception has also varied in accordance with the view one has of the underlying purposes of investment treaties – do they promote the international rule of law or narrow corporate interests at the expense of the public interest? Accordingly, those critical of investment treaties and arbitration have welcomed the judgment, whereas the proponents of investment treaties have argued that the judgment leads to less ‘rule of law within the EU’. On a higher level of abstraction, the plausibility of the Court’s reasoning also depends on the view one has of the EU in general: is it an autonomous constitutional order based on the protection of fundamental rights and certain foundational values? Or should the EU demonstrate more openness towards other international law regimes, as it is just one such regime among others? Depending on the view one has over these two intertwined general questions, Achmea can either appear as a logical corollary of EU constitutionalism or as a breach of the EU’s commitment to the international rule of law.
What this blogpost strives to do is to take issue with the Court’s understanding that arbitral tribunals interpret and apply EU law in ways that pose a threat to its autonomy. The point is not to argue that the Court’s reasoning and conclusions are incorrect, but to shed light on the ways in which arbitral tribunals have actually ‘used’ EU law, and to show that the Court’s understanding (with which most commentators sympathize) that investment arbitration poses a threat to the autonomy of EU law is somewhat inflated. Continue reading
By Christina Eckes
After last week’s Achmea ruling of the Court of Justice (CJEU) Member States can no longer legally go ahead with ratifying CETA – the mixed Free Trade Agreement that the EU and its Member States agreed with Canada. Achmea casts serious doubts on the legality of CETA’s investment chapter, which allows investors from one Party to submit to an arbitral tribunal a claim that the other Party has breached an obligation under CETA. By simply going ahead with the ratification, they violate the principle of loyalty under European Union law.
On 6 March, the CJEU declared in its Achmea ruling that the investor-state-dispute-settlement (ISDS) mechanism in the bilateral investment treaty between the Netherlands and Slovakia (NL-SK-BIT) as incompatible with EU law. A request by Belgium is pending before the CJEU asking for clarification on the legality of the new Investor Court System in CETA (Opinion 1/17). Achmea is a clear indication that the CJEU in Opinion 1/17 is likely to find also the Investor Court System in CETA problematic for the autonomy of EU law.
No general obligation exists for Member States to halt national ratification of mixed agreements when their compatibility with EU is questioned before the CJEU. Yet, CETA is different. The clear indication of incompatibility in Achmea imposes an obligation on national Parliaments to halt the CETA ratification process and wait for Opinion 1/17. Continue reading