Tagged: Directive 2012/13/EU

Cautious Openness: the Spanish Constitutional Court’s approach to EU law in recent national case law

By Mario García

In recent months, the Spanish Constitutional Court (SCC) has issued a series of decisions related to EU law that show an interesting combination of both openness toward the European legal order and a certain degree of apprehension to the growing role of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in constitutional matters. In these cases the SCC has arrived at fairly pro-EU results: the SCC decided that preliminary references from Spanish courts to the CJEU take precedence over constitutional questions submitted to the SCC, and that a non-transposed, directly-effective EU Directive can be taken as a factor in the interpretation of a constitutional provision. But, as discussed below, the details subtly suggest that the SCC does not fully agree with the ways in which the CJEU has asserted its institutional position, and prefers to avoid potential conflicts in the future. Continue reading

Case C-216/14 Covaci –Minimum rules, yet effective protection?

By Stijn Lamberigts

Covaci is the first case dealing with two of the so-called Roadmap Directives on procedural safeguards in criminal proceedings, Directive 2010/64/EU on the right to interpretation and translation in criminal proceedings and Directive 2012/13/EU on the right to information in criminal proceedings. The Roadmap Directives are the latest attempt of the EU to increase the mutual trust between Member States (MS) in the field of criminal justice, by establishing EU minimum rules for procedural safeguards. An earlier attempt failed and some have questioned the added value of the Roadmap Directives to the standards provided by the ECHR and the Charter of Fundamental Rights. Both the CJEU and the national courts can play a defining role in ensuring that the minimum rules of the Roadmap Directives really contribute to more effective defence rights throughout the EU. The preliminary ruling in Covaci seems to indicate that the CJEU is willing to take up that role – to a large, but not unlimited, extent.  Continue reading