What is an ‘internal armed conflict’ in EU law? This was a question which the Belgian Conseil d’État referred to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), asking in essence whether this concept is to be understood as defined in international humanitarian law (IHL) or as a term with an independent meaning in the Union legal order.
On 30 January 2014, the CJEU gave its answer in the Diakité judgment, which concerns the granting of ‘subsidiary protection’ to third country nationals as well as stateless persons who seek refuge in the EU from such ‘internal armed conflicts’. By giving an autonomous meaning to the latter term in EU law, the CJEU has spoken up for a lower threshold for receiving such status throughout the 28 Member States. While this is, from a legal point of view, a highly interesting case with regard to the relationship between EU law and international law, it amounts, more practically speaking, to good news for all those in search of shelter from violence-ridden regions on a continent marked by an increasing reluctance to welcome foreigners (note most recently the successful Swiss referendum on limiting mass immigration). Continue reading
Bananas are back on the menu of the Court of Justice of the EU. The court of first instance of Brussels (Interim Decision of 17 May 2013, 196/33/13, in Dutch, not online) decided to refer a preliminary question to Luxembourg concerning the consistency of Council Regulation 1964/2005 regarding import tariffs for bananas with the EU’s obligations under the GATT. Soon the Court is to decide whether to address this question in a regular panel, or instead in a Grand Chamber. This decision itself will signal whether the Court considers this a fresh legal argument warranting scrupulous attention, or regards this simply as old, long-settled questions. In this post, I will argue that authoritative judicial clarifications would indeed be desirable in this case. Continue reading
On the 24th of September the CJEU delivered its judgement in the Demirkan case. Ms Demirkan, a Turkish national, had requested a short-term tourist Visa to German authorities to go and visit her stepfather, a German national. However, since the German authorities rejected her request, Ms Demirkan attacked the decision arguing that on the basis of Article 41(1) of the Additional Protocol to the EU–Turkey Association Agreement she was entitled to enter Germany without a Visa because at the time of the conclusion of the Additional Protocol -1970- Turkish nationals did not need a Visa to enter Germany as tourists. On the basis of Ms Demirkan’s claim, the referring court in Berlin addressed two questions to the CJEU. First, it asked whether article 41(1) of the Additional protocol containing the ‘stand-still’ clause on restrictions related to the freedom of establishment and the freedom to provide services included the passive reception of services. Secondly, the referring court asked the CJEU whether a tourist traveling to visit family could be considered as a passive recipient of services when the purpose of traveling is personal and not economical. Continue reading
Is the Kadi case law of the Court of Justice of the EU to public international lawyers what the acquittal of O.J. Simpson in 1995 was to conservative white people in the USA? Did the CJEU simply sacrifice the supremacy of the UN Charter because it bought into the legal tricks of a Saudi businessman and his legal team, persuading the judges in Luxembourg by arguing that, to paraphrase the late Johnnie Cochran: ‘If the legal orders don’t fit, you must acquit’?
This July, the CJEU handed down the latest – and probably final – instalment of this legal saga which has captivated both EU and international law scholars for many years. Thanks what is commonly known as the Kadi II judgment, the academic year 2013/14 starts off with the end of what was undoubtedly one of the most vividly discussed series of cases in Luxembourg, not least if you’re interested in EU constitutionalism, fundamental rights and due process, external relations, international security and the fight against global terrorism, as well as, last but not least, the supremacy of the UN Charter in international law.
In view of the current hype on Massive Open Online Courses (MOOCs), spawning recently a grant competition of the Stifterverband für die Deutsche Wissenschaft and iversity for courses to be hosted, publicly available and free of charge, on a Europe-based MOOC platform, a few thoughts an EU law, legal education and MOOCs are in order. It should be added at the outset that the author of this post is coordinating one of the bids for a MOOC grant for a course entitled “Europe in the World: Law and Policy Aspects of the EU in Global Governance”, which makes him particularly invested in this issue. The author is grateful to European Law Blog Team that he was granted the opportunity to share his thoughts on these developments, as well as his bid, in the form of this post.
Transnational law meets transnational education
Ever since Prof. Sebastian Thrun’s historic feat of attracting more than 150,000 students to his Massive Open Online Course on artificial intelligence two years ago, MOOCs have started to shake up the landscape and minds of higher education. In a kind of “gold rush”, academics want to join this remarkable development, and companies are being founded to provide platforms for such ventures, predominantly in the US, but also more recently in Europe. Beyond subjects closer to technology, such as computer science or engineering, the social sciences and humanities have also come to feel the potential and attraction of MOOCs. Continue reading
It finally happened: After more than a decade, Mr Yassin Abdullah Kadi is no longer ‘blacklisted’ by the UN and the EU.
To recall, on 17 October 2001, the United Nations Security Council added Mr Kadi to a so-called ‘blacklist’, thus requiring his financial assets to be frozen in view of his suspected involvement in the financing of international terrorism. Two days later, the EU followed suit by adding Mr Kadi on its own list and thus subjecting him to EU measures implementing the Security Council resolutions, which Mr Kadi subsequently challenged before the EU courts. Fast forward almost eleven years: On 5 October 2012, the Security Council removed Mr Kadi from the UN list, ‘after concluding its consideration of the delisting request submitted by this individual through the Ombudsperson’. A week later, the EU followed suit once more and took Mr Kadi off its list as well.
As readers may know, the hot topic in many international law circles this past week was the Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. case currently under consideration by the US Supreme Court. On October 1, the Supreme Court heard a second round of arguments in the case specifically concerning the issue of the extraterritoriality of the US Alien Tort Statue (ATS). While this case primarily involves US and international law, EU lawyers may be interested to know that the European Commission submitted an amicus curiae brief to the Court. The brief, which is a fascinating read for anyone interested in EU foreign policy, details the EU’s position on the extraterritoriality issue. In short, it argues that (1) the US should exercise universal civil jurisdiction only in cases for which universal criminal jurisdiction would apply, and that (2) the ATS should include an exhaustion requirement.
Have you wondered recently whatever happened to all that “fragmentation of international law” we used to worry about? Well, a 2011 volume edited by Malcolm Evans and Panos Koutrakos and published by Hart Publishing, that’s what happened. While I would like to introduce you briefly to the whole volume, there is one contribution I would particularly like to draw your attention to.
To put you in context, this is in my view a good book for those among us who were fascinated by the „fragmentation of international law“ debate starting (or at least becoming one of THE topics) in the 2000s; who have perhaps read Koskenniemi’s report for the International Law Commission or other literature on the topic (legal pluralism, Pauwelyn’s Conflict of Norms, you name it); who find themselves now stuck in one of the boxes and/or compartments of international or EU law; and who probably would love an update and overview over where we stand today. Continue reading
One of the most interesting and complex issues in international trade over the past decade has been how to deal with the opening Chinese market. As China has become more integrated into international markets and has joined the WTO, its trading partners have sometimes struggled with the non-market aspects of its economy. Industries hard hit by Chinese competition have argued that Chinese interference with its internal market and support for domestic companies amount to unfair trading practices, and that they should consequently be compensated or controlled. Regulators have had sympathy for these concerns, applying trade remedies like countervailing measures and anti-dumping duties to Chinese products. However, this practice has led to counter-accusations of protectionism and discrimination. The recent spate of complaints both by and against China in the WTO is evidence of this struggle.
Last week’s Xinanchem judgment, however, is a significant step along the path toward normalized trade relations between China and the EU. In this case, which Advocate General Kokott called “of fundamental importance for future trade relations between the European Union and a number of dynamic emerging countries, such as the People’s Republic of China” (AG para. 1), the Grand Chamber of the ECJ dismissed the Council’s appeal of a General Court judgment in favor of the Chinese company.
Argentina made headlines last week with its plan to nationalize oil company YPF. The decision to expropriate 51% of the shares in YPF hydrocarbons corporation–eliminating the controlling stake of Spanish firm Repsol–was announced on 16 April, and was accompanied by a takeover of the company’s office by Argentine authorities.
In response, Repsol has announced its intent to pursue an expropriation claim, and Spain has taken retaliatory measures, seeking to restrict imports of biodiesel fuel from Argentina.
The EU has made clear its displeasure with Argentina and its intent to support Spain. But given that this is an investment case that legally falls primarily under the Spain-Argentina bilateral investment treaty (BIT), what role can the EU play?