Tagged: primacy

“Does the principle of the autonomy of the EU legal order allow for a Member State to revoke the notification of its withdrawal from the EU?”

By Manolis Perakis

The question whether it would be lawful for a Member State to revoke the notification of withdrawal from the EU before the two-year lapse (laid down in the third paragraph of Article 50 TEU) has, clearly, vital political, economic and social implications. Even though it cuts to the core of the philosophy governing the “ever closer Union” and the role that States and private individuals play in it, it’s also a matter to which the provision itself does not give a definite answer. Moreover, there is no case law issued on the matter by the CJEU that could contribute to the interpretation of the provision, while the UK Supreme Court seems to have posited the irrevocability of a withdrawal notification in the famous judgment issued in the case of R (Miller) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union [UKSC 2016/0196], foregoing the opportunity to use the preliminary reference mechanism. This absence of relevant CJEU case-law is expected to change after the Inner House of the Court of Session in Scotland decided on 21.09.2018 to refer a relevant preliminary question (see O. Garner’s analysis),

Part of the literature expressing interesting and strong legal arguments has suggested the answer to the above question to the positive (e.g. P. Craig, S. Peers, O. Garner, A. Sari). Arguing the contrary and attempting a contribution to the academic debate, this post’s point of view is based on the fundamental principle that the EU legal order constitutes an “autonomous legal system”, which is governed by its own rules enacted by its own institutions and interpreted by its established Court (C-26/62, Van Gend en Loos). It is, therefore, argued that the legal lacuna regarding the provision of revoking the withdrawal notification, leads, according to the interpretation of the provision set out in Article 50 TEU – in line with the letter and spirit thereof – to the conclusion that permitting such a revocation would contradict the principle of autonomy, regardless of whether it is unilateral or initiated upon consensus.

The present post is divided into two parts. In the first part I approach the interpretation of Article 50 TEU through its letter and spirit. In the second part I develop my argumentation concerning the critical role that the fundamental principle of autonomy should play when attempting to find the true meaning of the provision and to fill the legal gap concerning the right to revoke the withdrawal notification. Continue reading

Cautious Openness: the Spanish Constitutional Court’s approach to EU law in recent national case law

By Mario García

In recent months, the Spanish Constitutional Court (SCC) has issued a series of decisions related to EU law that show an interesting combination of both openness toward the European legal order and a certain degree of apprehension to the growing role of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in constitutional matters. In these cases the SCC has arrived at fairly pro-EU results: the SCC decided that preliminary references from Spanish courts to the CJEU take precedence over constitutional questions submitted to the SCC, and that a non-transposed, directly-effective EU Directive can be taken as a factor in the interpretation of a constitutional provision. But, as discussed below, the details subtly suggest that the SCC does not fully agree with the ways in which the CJEU has asserted its institutional position, and prefers to avoid potential conflicts in the future. Continue reading

“So long (as) and Farewell?” The United Kingdom Supreme Court in Miller

By Oliver Garner

Introduction – A Timely History Lesson

On the 24th January 2017, 7 months to the day of the result of the UK’s referendum to leave the European Union, the President of the United Kingdom Supreme Court delivered the judgment in the Miller appeal. The Court held, by an 8-3 majority, that the UK Government did not have the power to give notice under Article 50 TEU to withdraw from the European Union without a prior Act of Parliament .

Lord Neuberger started the announcement in the manner of a history lecture, detailing the United Kingdom’s accession to the then European Economic Community in 1973. This was a fitting introduction to a judgment which at times reads like a lesson in the UK’s constitution. Accordingly, this lesson encompasses the place that EU law occupies within this order. This post will attempt to provide a concise summary of the magisterial judgment, before providing some comment on the salient issues relevant to EU law. Continue reading

Melloni as a Wake-up Call – Setting Limits to Higher National Standards of Fundamental Rights’ Protection

By Vanessa Franssen

I plead guilty: this post on the Melloni ruling of the CJEU should have been written long ago. However, instead of invoking attenuating circumstances, I prefer to draw your attention to the reasons why a blog post on this case still is highly relevant today. First, Melloni is a true landmark case with respect to the relation between EU and national standards of fundamental rights in the field of criminal justice. Central issue in this case was whether Member States are still allowed to impose a higher level of fundamental rights’ protection for cross-border cooperation in criminal matters than the standard set by EU law. Second, Melloni has become ‘hot’ again thanks to the recent follow-up judgment of the Spanish Constitutional Court, which shows the real impact of the CJEU’s ruling and which will be discussed in a separate post by M. García García.

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The German Federal Constitutional Court on Outright Monetary Transactions by the European Central Bank – pressing the CJEU or a friendly gesture?

On Friday, February 7th, 2014, the German Federal Constitutional Court (BVerfG) requested the CJEU for preliminary ruling for the first time. The request is exceptional in terms of both European Union law and German constitutional law. Commentators call the decision a Spring in the Desert, a Golden Bridge to Luxembourg or simply put Historic. The BVerfG stated its opinion throughout several decisions regarding fundamental questions between the European Union and its Member States (e.g. Solange I, Solange II, Maastricht, Lisbon), but always abstained from requesting a preliminary ruling. This time, however, the BVerfG indeed submitted a question. The stakes in the case are high, as the BVerfG considers giving an ultra vires ruling regarding a decision by the Governing Council of the European Central Bank (ECB) concerning Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) unless the CJEU announces that that decision is partially incompatible with primary law or restricts its scope. If the “conditions” laid out by the BVerfG are not met by the CJEU, the decision on OMT will be declared incompatible with the German constitution. The consequence would be that German authorities would not be bound to the decision by the ECB. In other words, the German central bank with around 18 % in capital subscriptions (shares) of the ECB would not participate in OMTs. Continue reading

Primacy and the Czech Constitutional Court

Primacy, that is the precedence EU law takes over any national laws in cases of conflict, is one of the most fundamental aspects of EU law. The primacy doctrine elaborated in Costa/ENEL by the Court has not always been fully endorsed by various constitutional courts in the Member States (the Solange judgment of the Bundesverfassungsgericht is the most well known example). However, to date national courts have always applied the doctrine, albeit with reservations.

That has ended with a recent ruling by the Czech Constitutional Court. In a case concerning an alleged discrimanatory pension scheme in the Czech republic that resulted from the dissolvation of Czechoslovakia, it held that the Court in its judgment in Case C-399/09 Landtová acted ultra vires and subsequently gave Czech national law precedence over EU law. This is a quote from the press release of the Czech Constitutional Court:

In its judgement, the Constitutional Court first expressed its view on the conclusions following from the judgement of the Court of Justice of the EU. In the introduction, the Constitutional Court summarized its previous case-law concerning the relationship between national and European law and above all emphasised the thesis (which follows also from the doctrine of the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany) under which constitutional courts maintain their role of supreme guardians of constitutionality even in the realms of the EU and even against potential excesses on the side of EU bodies. In this respect, the Constitutional Court believes that a European regulation which governs co-ordination of pension system among the member states may not be applied to an entirely specific situation of a dissolution of the Czechoslovak federation and to consequences stemming thereof. The Constitutional Court wishes to emphasise that the period of employment for an employer based in the territory of today´s Slovak Republic cannot be considered a period of employment in abroad (besides, social security had been subject to federal competence in the entire period of existence of the Czechoslovak federation). Therefore, the Constitutional Court expressed the view that matters of social security and claims following from them did not in the case of so-called Slovak pensions contain a foreign element which is a prerequisite for the application of the co-ordination regulation. This issue cannot be compared to consideration of social security claims with respect to acknowledgement of periods obtained in different states, whilst it is the issue of consequences of dissolution of the Czechoslovak federation and of division of costs on social security between the successor states.

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