By Vincent Delhomme
After its State of the Union address of 13 September 2017, in which he presented his vision for the future of the Europe Union, President Juncker announced the creation of a Task Force to reflect on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality in EU policymaking and to make propositions to strengthen their role (see the President’s Decision). After several meetings and consultations, the Task Force published its findings in a final Report and the Commission released a Communication in October 2018 in which it commits to follow several of the propositions made.
This commentary presents some of these recommendations and sketches some (rough) reflections on the place of the principle of subsidiarity in the EU legal order and how to improve its role as a tool to control EU legislative activity. Continue reading
Limits to EU Powers: A Case Study of EU Regulatory Criminal Law by Jacob Oberg (Hart Publishing 2017, ISBN 9781509903368) £64.99
By Christopher Harding
In these days of burgeoning specialist discussion and publication of what is now firmly embedded under the title ‘EU criminal law’, Jacob Oberg’s book stands out as a distinctive contribution to the debates, with some real potential to drive forward policy and law. Broadly speaking, this work presents a strategy for a project which is in some respects bold and inventive – the legal (and hence constitutional) testing of policies and legal measures of criminalisation. And here we are talking about criminalisation in a novel and different context, that of EU policy and law. It is also a response to the significant, but still unheralded and poorly appreciated entry of the EU into that domain. So there is a real need for outward looking and engaging accounts of a subject on which debate is still really confined to a small quarter. Continue reading
Some time ago, I discussed here the European Commission’s proposal on the establishment of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (‘EPPO proposal’). As I pointed out, this proposal adopts a ‘federal’ logic, aiming at an EU-wide criminal law enforcement of fraud against the financial interests of the Union (in short: EU fraud). The EPPO, when and if created, would have exclusive competence to investigate and prosecute EU fraud, thereby excluding any prosecutorial discretion at national level. What is more, the involvement of Eurojust would be reduced to an absolute minimum, even though Eurojust has acquired a lot of expertise over the years in coordinating and supporting criminal investigations and prosecutions of EU fraud. With this proposal, the Commission clearly wants to move away from the ‘old’ intergovernmental approach of the pre-Lisbon era.
As one could expect, the Commission’s federal approach triggered many negative reactions. By the deadline of 28 October 2013, national Parliaments of fourteen Member States expressed their critical concerns regarding the Commission’s EPPO proposal. Eleven of them even formally submitted a reasoned opinion, objecting that, for a variety of reasons (infra), the proposal does not respect the principle of subsidiarity. By using the Early Warning System laid down in Article 7 of Protocol No 2 to the Lisbon Treaty on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, these national Parliaments issue a so-called ‘yellow card’ against the EPPO proposal. Strictly speaking, the German Bundesrat did not issue a reasoned opinion, but its report clearly shares some concerns of subsidiarity. Similarly, the Polish Senate criticizes the EPPO’s exclusive competence for not being in compliance with the principle of proportionality. Lastly, the Austrian National Council does not reject the EPPO proposal, but nonetheless identifies four major points of concern.