December 18, 2025 marked the publication of two eagerly awaited appeal judgments by the Grand Chamber of the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU). In two cases concerning fundamental rights protection in the context of Frontex operations – WS and Others v Frontex and Hamoudi v Frontex, the Grand Chamber set aside the respective General Court orders which had previously dismissed the applicants’ claims. In the judgments, the Grand Chamber notably took a different approach to assessing the applicants’ situation. Diverting from the General Court’s more technical interpretation, it explicitly acknowledged the vulnerable situation of asylum seekers. While it remains to be seen whether the applicants’ claims will ultimately succeed, the Court’s shift in perspective reframes Frontex’s role in alleged pushback operations, enabling a more realistic assessment of the practical realities faced by asylum seekers.
Facts and General Court judgments
Both claims were brought as an action for damages under Article 268 TFEU. WS and Others concerned a return operation during which a Syrian family was returned from Greece to Türkiye. They eventually left for Iraq where they settled. After lodging several unsuccessful complaints with the Frontex Fundamental Rights Officer, the applicants turned to the CJEU. In their claim, they argued that Frontex was responsible for the damage suffered as a result of their return to Turkiye and that all three cumulative conditions for non-contractual liability in accordance with Article 340 TFEU, namely a sufficiently serious breach of a rule of law intended to confer rights on individuals, actual damage suffered, and an existing causal link between the damage and Frontex’s conduct, were fulfilled.
The General Court decided to limit its analysis to the existence of a causal link, rejecting the applicants’ claim in short and concise judgment. It found, firstly, that Frontex’s mandate was merely to assist the Member States, not to assess the merits of the applicants’ return decisions or applications for asylum, which remains a Member State competence (paras 64-66). Moreover, the applicants’ relocation to Iraq and the costs occurred therefore resulted primarily from the applicants’ own choice which would in any case break the causal link (paras 67-69). Accordingly, it found that it was not “but for” Frontex’s conduct that the damage occurred (para 71).
The claim in Hamoudi was brought by a Syrian national who was also returned from Greece to Türkiye where he was placed in a detention centre with his passport confiscated. In his claim, the applicant asked for compensation for the damage suffered, arguing that it was the result of Frontex’s activities. The General Court’s assessment centred around the issue of the burden of proof to establish that actual damage had occurred. The Court found that several of the pieces of evidence submitted by the applicant were insufficient to demonstrate actual damage (para 39). A witness statement by the applicant was considered insufficiently detailed since none of those involved had been identified (paras 40-41). Photographs taken at the event were found inadequate since they too did not allow the identification of the individuals involved (paras 44-48). And an article written by a journalist group, as well as two videos of the event, were rejected as too general since they did not provide specific information about the operation and did not mention the applicant by name (para 39, paras 53-55). The General Court therefore rejected the applicant’s claim as manifestly lacking any foundation in law (para 62).
Both judgments were heavily criticised by commentators. It was widely argued that the Court’s approach to causation and the burden of proof respectively had been too restrictive, diverting attention from the real question of Frontex’s fundamental rights obligations in the Mediterranean. Regarding WS and Others, commentators criticised the Court’s focus on the argument that Frontex was under no obligation to verify the merits of the applicants’ return decisions and that therefore, there was no causal link. This, they argued, failed to recognise the reality of Frontex’s involvement in return operations, allowing the agency to escape liability (see, e.g., here and here). Hamoudi was largely criticised for its high threshold for the provision of evidence, with commentators pointing to the impossibility of attaining the required evidence in situations such as the applicant’s (see, e.g., here, here and here). Taken together, and in combination with other unsuccessful cases against Frontex, these judgments were largely seen as problematic or even symbolic of a larger “human rights responsibility gap” (see here).
The Grand Chamber’s take on causation
Both cases were appealed before the Grand Chamber which set aside the General Court’s orders. In WS and Others, the Court sided with Advocate General Ćapeta who had argued that Frontex was under an obligation to verify whether there was a return decision before conducting such an operation. By agreeing with her, the Grand Chamber rejected the General Court’s argument that there was no causal link because Frontex was under no obligation to verify the merits of the return decisions. It acknowledged that, while Frontex did not have the competence to assess the merits, it had an obligation to check whether a return decision existed. The Court rejected Frontex’s arguments that this would violate the principles of conferral and sincere cooperation since the first was not infringed and the second could not have the effect of allowing Frontex to circumvent specific obligations conferred on it (paras 105-108). Thus, while it is for the General Court to apply the legal tests to the facts of the case, the Grand Chamber acknowledged the possibility of a causal link.
Furthermore, the Court reacted to the argument that the causal link would be broken by the applicants’ decision to relocate to Iraq while under the temporary Turkish travel permit. It found that, while the causal link can in theory be broken by the applicants’ conduct, it must be established in concreto whether this was the case, which the General Court had failed to do. Importantly, the Court stated that such an assessment must “tak[e] into consideration all the relevant circumstances characterising the situation of the adversely affected person” (para 154), acknowledging that vulnerable applicants cannot be required to make purely rational decisions in the same way as economic actors (para 155).
In her Opinion on the case, the Advocate General had also discussed the possibility of joint and several liability of Frontex. Pointing to earlier case law, notably to the Court’s recent judgment in Kočner v Europol, the Advocate General had acknowledged this scenario as a viable option since both Greece and Frontex are under a separate duty to ensure fundamental rights compliance (paras 89-93). In its judgment, the Grand Chamber did not specifically address this question as this would have amounted to a new plea in law which the applicants are prohibited from raising at this point in the proceedings (paras 82-87).
The Grand Chamber’s take on the burden of proof
The appeal in Hamoudi focused on whether the General Court’s approach to assessing the evidence provided by the applicant had been too strict. In his Opinion, Advocate General Norkus had argued in favour of a reversal of the burden of proof in situations involving vulnerable applicants. He had suggested three cumulative conditions to attain this reversal, namely that the applicant brings prima facie evidence of the violations, a clear and structural asymmetry regarding the parties’ access to the evidence, and that a failure to reverse the burden of proof would deprive the applicant of their fundamental rights (paras 57-60). The Grand Chamber followed the Advocate General’s Opinion in acknowledging a possible reversal of the burden of proof (para 106). It did not apply the conditions suggested but instead focused solely on the existence of prima facie evidence. Noting that “the only relevant criterion for the purpose of assessing the probative value of evidence lawfully adduced relates to its credibility” (para 114), it found the evidence provided by the applicant sufficiently credible and consistent to constitute prima facie evidence (para 152).
Both judgments gave the respective applicants reasons to celebrate. By setting aside the General Court orders, the Court opened the possibility of a favourable final judgment. Furthermore, in referring the cases back to the General Court, the Grand Chamber agreed with several of the applicants’ arguments, notably forcing the General Court to reconsider its take on causation and the applicable burden of proof. First reactions to the judgments have therefore been positive (see here, here and here), applauding the Grand Chamber’s new approach to Frontex’s accountability.
Acknowledging the applicants’ vulnerable position
The Grand Chamber judgments read differently from the General Court cases. Instead of reviewing the legal issues in a purely technical manner, both appeal judgments include empathetic passages which actively discuss the applicants’ vulnerable situation. In its discussion of the causal link in WS and Others, the Grand Chamber noted that
“while entirely rational decision-making may be expected of economic operators […] such rational behaviour cannot be elevated to the rank of a criterion of general application, in particular when natural persons are concerned. […] Asylum seekers may be particularly vulnerable by reason of their migration and the traumatic experiences they are likely to have endured prior to that migration” (para 155-156, emphasis added).
The Grand Chamber contrasted the vulnerable position of those arriving in the EU in search of asylum with the position of other actors who might be in a better position to thoroughly think about the potential consequences of their actions. This approach allowed the Grand Chamber to arrive at the conclusion that the applicants’ decision to relocate to Iraq could not be considered their own choice but could be the result of Frontex’s involvement in the pushback.
In a similar vein, in Hamoudi, the Grand Chamber discussed the applicant’s position as part of its assessment of the evidence. These considerations were the result of the applicant’s argument that his position warranted a reversal of the burden of proof where Frontex was in possession of the main evidence, which the Advocate General had supported. In its judgment, the Grand Chamber acknowledged that
“[a] pushback operation such as that is characterised by the significant vulnerability of the persons subject to it. […] [T]hose persons are, at the time of the facts, in a position which makes it very difficult for them to collect evidence for the purpose of proving such facts, or even excludes any possibility of their doing so at all” (para 88, emphasis added).
The Grand Chamber compared the applicant’s vulnerable position with Frontex’s involvement in the incident, finding the latter to be in a more suited position to provide evidence. Emphasising Frontex’s fundamental rights obligations, it reached the conclusion that a reversal of the burden of proof might be justified (paras 90-102). The Grand Chamber thereby diverted from the General Court’s approach which had not differentiated between the applicant’s and Frontex’s possibilities of providing evidence.
The Court’s explicit focus on the applicants’ vulnerable position allows for a more realistic and humane assessment of the situation encountered by asylum seekers in the Mediterranean. This is significant not only because it paints a more accurate picture of the realities encountered by those arriving in the EU. Acknowledging the applicants’ vulnerability had a substantial effect on how the Court interpreted the legal tests at issue in the judgments – namely, the existence of causality and the burden of proof. It is of course still unclear whether the two cases discussed will be successful since both of them were referred back to the General Court for an analysis of the facts. It will have to be seen how the General Court assesses the applicants’ claims in light of the Grand Chamber’s considerations and to what extent the Grand Chamber continues its more considerate approach in future cases. More case law is thus needed to assess the impact of such considerations on Frontex’s legal accountability in the long term. Nevertheless, the judgments represents a significant step forward. It is important that the Court continues assessing Frontex’s non-contractual liability in light of factual power imbalances. Only then can it ensure that the rules on non-contractual liability have the effect they were intended to have – to hold EU bodies liable for the damage caused by their actions.
