The action for failure to act under Article 265 TFEU appears unavailable to private applicants in the context of Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) restrictive measures (“sanctions”, i.e. travel bans, asset freezes, etc.). This is due to the cumulative effect of two structural constraints: the (strict) test for standing under Article 265(3) TFEU meeting the legal design of CFSP decisions. The restricted jurisdiction of the CJEU in the field of CFSP more generally completes the picture. In this post, a recent case – T‑482/25 JURDI v Council and Commission – before the General Court (GC) will serve as a springboard for framing the issue.
Before delving into the topic, a caveat: others have recently covered the case before the GC, advocating for the ECJ to reconsider its approach on locus standi in the appeal of the GC’s order now pending before it. On this blog, a post has previously touched on a similar topic albeit in relation to Article 263 TFEU. Here, the aim will be to make the most of the case for the purposes of CFSP sanctions litigation by attempting to draw a line in the sand on the expansion of the system of judicial remedies available for CFSP sanctions. Specifically, it will be argued that the action for failure to act marks one of its limits.
The JURDI case
In July 2025, the association “Juristes pour le Respect du Droit International” (JURDI) brought both Council and Commission before the GC alleging unlawful inaction of the European Union in the face of the increased military activity of Israel in the Gaza strip (JURDI v Council and Commission, para. 1). Since human rights violations keep occurring in Gaza, the action is relevant also as it channels growing civil society discontent into an attempt to address a perceived passivity of the Union on the matter (for other civil initiatives, see here). As a consequence, the case was in the spotlight, if only briefly and mainly for its symbolic value.
For EU lawyers, the second claim brought forward by the applicant stands out: the Council’s failure to activate sanctions pursuant to Article 29 TEU violated the Treaties (JURDI, para. 1), a novelty in litigation on CFSP sanctions. As largely expected, in September 2025, the GC dismissed the action for a clear lack of locus standi of the applicant. At the same time, the GC fell short of an assessment on this specific claim for the Council’s failure to act. Instead, it focused on JURDI’s lack of direct and individual concern as an “association” (whose prospects of standing, in general, are rather bleak; see Federolio, para. 60) and on the irrelevance – under EU law – of any impact the (alleged) omission in law had on the objectives of JURDI’s statutory mission (JURDI, paras. 12-26). Ultimately, it rejected JURDI’s attempt to leverage the right to effective judicial protection as grounds for relaxing the test for admissibility (JURDI, para. 27). JURDI has in the meantime filed an appeal before the ECJ; however, a different outcome seems unlikely.
EU principles and international law obligations under the shadow of “high politics”
Article 3(5) TEU lays down the Union’s core commitment to the respect and promotion of international law as the “methodological imperative” of its external action, of which the CFSP forms a key part. Yet, the bloc has refrained from taking any significant action vis-à-vis documented violations of international (humanitarian) law occurred in the Gaza strip since the Hamas-led attacks on 7 October 2023, especially considering the erga omnes obligation to prevent and punish the crime of genocide (ex multis, see here, here). This sits uneasily with the proven capacity of EU external action to go beyond humanitarian assistance by activating coercive instruments. So far, for example, most (unattended) institutional calls to leverage the EU’s economic weight have involved the suspension of the EU-Israel Association Agreement. For some, at this point, the silence of the assertive dimension of EU (external relations) law is nothing short of an “ominous lacuna”.
Here, sanctions are caught between principles of EU law and international law obligations (the rock) and the wide discretion of Member States, acting through the Council, in the realm of “high politics” (the much harder place, see here, p. 3-4). Without prejudice to this wider discussion, the focus of this post will be on whether individuals and entities can resort to an underused EU legal remedy – the action for failure to act under Article 265 TFEU – to break political deadlocks that stand in the way of the adoption of sanctions.
The reach of the CJEU on CFSP sanctions: “just” an exception to the exemption?
In the current state of affairs, restrictive measures dominate CFSP legal output. For reasons of space, suffice it to say that Article 215 TFEU empowers the Council to adopt sanctions via a “political” CFSP decision based on Article 29 TEU. Under the sanctions decision-making procedure, a regulation must follow if the restrictions fall within the scope of other EU competences apart from CFSP (for more on this distinct “dual-step” procedure, see here and here).
The TEU and TFEU generally carve out EU foreign policy from the general jurisdiction of the CJEU to review EU acts. Against this background, the “claw-back” clause in Article 275(2) TFEU opens individual sanctions up to judicial review in accordance with the action for annulment under Article 263(4) TFEU. It is worth recalling that the CJEU has not clarified the precise extent of its (limited) scrutiny in the field of CFSP as a whole so far, although it showed signs of having internalized its existence more than once (e.g. Opinion 2/13, paras. 251-252) and, recently, even in the context of an action for damages arising from a Common Security and Defence Policy mission (joined cases KS and KD, paras. 115 and 118).
Moreover, this “exception to the exemption” for individual sanctions is substantial as it counts on a strong jurisprudential enabler. Post-Lisbon case law reveals a clear trend of the CJEU incrementally extending its jurisdiction grounded on a wide interpretation of the principle of effective judicial protection (based on Articles 19(1) TEU and 47 of the Charter; for more, here). In a nutshell, in its Rosneft judgment, the ECJ opened the gates to preliminary rulings challenging the validity of such sanctions; while in Bank Refah Kargaran, the Court went the extra mile by affirming jurisdiction over claims for damages caused by CFSP sanctions. When combined with the argument that Article 265 TFEU “prescribe[s] one and the same method of recourse” as the action for annulment under Article 263 TFEU (Chevalley v Commission,para. 6), the former seems likely to be next in line. However, applying requirements for locus standi to CFSP acts in the context of Article 265(3) TFEU suggests a different scenario before the EU judges, that might not prove to be at least another simple extension of its jurisdiction.
The test of standing under Article 265(3) TFEU meets the CFSP
The request of the imposition of CFSP sanctions presents a clear anomaly in EU law. The practical use of Article 265 TFEU for bringing an action for failure to act in this field must thus be examined further. Who would qualify as an individual applicant with standing for such an action? When it comes to annulment actions against sanctions, the case law reveals the serious impact on rights as the main reason why the CJEU grants, de facto, automatic standing under Article 263(4) TFEU. It follows that applicants in such cases most often are either targets of the sanctions themselves (or claim to be such) or somehow associated to the (accused) perpetrators (what counts is featuring in the annex of the CFSP decision, i.e. the “blacklist”). However, when it comes to actions under Article 265 TFEU, it is inconceivable that individual targets (or those associated) would bring proceedings against the Council to request sanctions to be imposed on themselves.
The action for failure to act plays a lesser role in the systems of EU judicial remedies but, when successful, compels the relevant institution to adopt the act unlawfully omitted under the Treaties. It embodies, among other things, a sui generisadversarial procedure that follows a pre-litigation phase in which the applicant must first call upon the institution to act (here, para. 9). Unlike an EU institution or a Member State that can freely seize the CJEU, natural or legal persons – non-privileged applicants – can only challenge the unlawful omission of (1) a legally binding act, which would also (2) be addressed to them. The first condition poses no particular issues: CFSP decisions are not legislative acts, but questions about their legal status are now considered mostly settled (see e.g. here, p. 74-77; here, p. 47 and 68). For the second condition, a closer look at the EU notion of “addressee” brings clarity.
The distinction between the objects of sanctions (targets) and the scope ratione personae of their legal act (actual addressees) is more than just semantic (or technical). CFSP decisions identify distinct natural and legal persons as targets, yet in practice they commit Member States (Articles 29, 24(3) and 31(1) TEU). Turning upside down the familiar logic that decisions bind the subjects they address confirms ultimately the “Masters of the Treaties” as their addressees (see Articles 288 and 297 TFEU). This is a hard blow for the position of individual claimants (targets or not). Jurisprudence on Article 265(3) TFEU in other policy fields has precluded their standing in decisions formally addressing Member States (Mackprang jr. v Commission). There is little reason why the approach would be different for the request of the imposition of CFSP sanctions.
As a final note on the mismatch between applicants and addressees, on the doctrinal level, decisions binding third parties, more generally, do not necessarily preclude actions under Article 265(3) TFEU (here, para. 22). This generous reading draws again on the complementarity with the action for annulment and on the wording of the TFEU in languages other than English. For example, the German version of Article 265(3) TFEU appears more permissive in this respect, as it may be read as bringing “any other private person” within the “magic circle” of (potential) non-privileged applicants (here, para 22). Early case law, however, presents a different picture. In the past, the CJEU has rejected standing of a non-privileged applicant where the omission in law took the form of a decision addressed to third parties (Bethell v Commission, paras. 16-17).
The real obstacle: direct concern
Leaving aside for a moment the question of addressees, let us turn to the standing conditions. In theory, for the CJEU, Articles 263 and 265 TFEU do not prescribe just two sides of the same remedy (Chevalley, para. 6) but also the same requirements for admissibility (Salehi v Commission (Order), para. 25). In practice, all that remains for non-privileged applicants to bring an action under Article 265 TFEU is to prove direct and individual concern. This already difficult endeavour adds to the CJEU’s presumption that concern is positive (as in “active”, but also “beneficial”) to prove, borrowing the paradigm in use for the action for annulment. Put differently, the applicant must prove concern by the requested CFSP decision rather than by (the legal effects of) its absence. The Asklepios Kliniken v Commission case is telling in this respect. Here, the then Court of First Instance based its assessment of admissibility on whether the private applicants would have had locus standi to bring an action for annulment for the same allegedly unlawfully omitted measures, had those been adopted (paras. 46ff.).
Direct concern arises when the measure impacts the legal situation of the applicant. The addressees of the contested act must enjoy virtually no discretion in its implementation (recently, Nord Stream v Council and Commission, para. 43). Importantly, implementation must result automatically from EU rules alone. Again, CFSP acts do not bind individuals but only the Member States. Further action on their part follows in the implementation of sanctions at the national level, sometimes even by means of an additional national legislative measure. All signs suggest that the failure to adopt a CFSP decision cannot be of direct concern to non-privileged applicants (here, p. 48). Essentially, establishing a direct causal relationship between sanctions and their (positive) legal effect on applicants under the paradigm of actions for failure to act appears inconceivable.
For the sake of simplicity and effectiveness, at this point, one may ask why not challenge the regulation implementing the CFSP decision instead. After all, recent (Russia-related) sanctions practice has shaken the “standard” decision-making procedure (for more, see here and here) to the point that the CFSP and TFEU measures are closer in content as ever before in the sanctions they impose. What is more, the limitations of judicial review on CFSP acts do not apply to the regulation adopted under Article 215(2) TFEU. Unfortunately, for private applicants, the CFSP decision is still conditio sine qua nonfor the implementing regulation to arise. This is a strong argument for why the CFSP decision must be challenged as well for the specific purposes of Article 265(3) TFEU.
Conclusions
In case law on sanctions after Lisbon, the CJEU has expanded its jurisdiction within the field of CFSP, bringing the legal tension between efficiency of sanctions and the protection of individual rights to the fore. It follows that the more access to the judicial remedies given to individuals and entities, the more the Council-led sanctions system comes under pressure. Against this general trend, the action for failure to act reveals itself as a structural blind spot in the system of judicial protection by design, almost as if the gates to adjudication were not designed to open any further.
To be fair, on the one hand, the CJEU has a past of granting exceptional standing if the situation was compelling in the context of annulment actions, an occurrence the above “complementarity of remedies” makes hard to rule out completely. The CJEU has taken the view that some discretion in the implementation can be allowed for the purpose of recognizing direct concern (Piraki-Piraki v Commission, paras. 6-9). Likewise, severe economic impact can single out applicants making them individually concerned (Extramet v Council, para. 17). On the other, the GC has also dismissed an action for failure to act by leveraging the wide discretion of EU institutions in the sphere of external relations (Mugraby v Council, paras. 35-45). In other words, the GC already swerved into the merits while carrying out a preliminary assessment of the locus standi of non-privileged applicants. This signals that, when external relations are concerned, the CJEU is (or least, has been in the past) prepared to go to considerable lengths to deny natural and legal persons standing rights under Article 265(3) TFEU. Back to JURDI, it seems unlikely that the ECJ will expand the admissibility assessment on appeal, meaning that the case will likely not serve as a litmus test for the argument advanced in this blogpost.
