On 26 March 2026, Advocate General (“AG”) Emiliou delivered his Opinion in Case C‑611/24 MA v Upravitelen savet na Balgarska narodna banka, a preliminary ruling request from Bulgaria’s Supreme Administrative Court, concerning the dismissal of a deputy governor of the Bulgarian National Bank (“BNB”).
This is only the second time the Court of Justice of the EU (“CJEU”) has been asked to interpret Article 14.2 of the Statute of the European System of Central Banks (“ESCB”) and of the European Central Bank (“ECB”). In the first case in 2019, Rimšēvičs and ECB v Latvia, the Court of Justice annulled Latvia’s suspension of its central bank’s governor accused of bribery, on the ground that no evidence of serious misconduct had been put forward.
Both the Rimšēvičs judgment and the currently pending Bulgarian case concern the dismissal of a senior official of a national central bank. The latter, however, decidedly extends the scope of the CJEU’s engagement with Article 14.2 of ESCB/ECB Statute and poses a more fundamental question: who gets to decide what counts as a fireable offence of a national central bank official?
In his article from 2019, Jürgen Bast observed that Rimšēvičs had pushed the EU further along the federal path of fusing EU law and Member State law into a single legal order. In the present case, the Opinion of AG Emiliou goes even further to reveal the mechanism through which that fusion operates. By doing so, AG Emiliou’s proposed answer, if followed by the Court of Justice, could have significant implications well beyond Bulgaria.
Case Facts and Background
In July 2024, Andrey Gurov, the elected Deputy Governor of the BNB and Head of its Issue Department, was found by the now-defunct Bulgaria’s Anti-Corruption Commission (Komisia za protivodeystvie na koruptsiata; “KPK”) to have a conflict of interest, including owning a minority shareholding in a private company and holding board positions in two non-profit entities, without obtaining the required authorization from the BNB’s Governing Council. In the same month, the Governing Council relied on the KPK’s finding to conclude that Gurov no longer fulfilled the conditions for the performance of his duties, and, in the alternative, had been guilty of serious misconduct within the meaning of Article 14.2 of the ESCB/ECB Statute. He was suspended and the matter was referred to the National Assembly to confirm his formal dismissal. The Bulgarian Supreme Administrative Court, before which Gurov challenged the decision of the National Assembly, stayed the proceedings and referred a total of eight questions to the Court of Justice.
The AG’s Interpretation of the Removability Test as an Autonomous Concept of EU Law
The AG divided the eight questions into four clusters:
1) whether the principle of independence allows for an obligation on decision-making members to declare conflicts of interest;
2) whether the removability test applies to deputy governors at all, given that Article 14.2 of the ESCB/ECB Statute speaks only of a governor;
3) whether the national law that dismissed Gurov is compatible with EU law; and
4) whether the BNB is competent to assess the existence of serious misconduct as per EU law (see para 13 of the Opinion).
In his assessment of those issues, the AG treats the provision that concerns the dismissal of a national central bank governor stipulated in Article 14.2 of the ESCB/ECB Statute as a “removability test” (Opinion, para 7). He identifies two grounds for dismissal in the provision — (1) the failure to fulfil the conditions for the performance of duties and (2) the finding of serious misconduct — which become the two limbs of the removability test. The AG’s central move is treating both limbs of the removability test as autonomous concepts of EU law (paras 84 and 95).
The significance of this interpretation is difficult to overstate. It means that what counts as grounds for dismissal of a national central bank official who falls within the scope of Article 14.2, is not determined unilaterally by the relevant Member State but by EU law as interpreted by the Court of Justice.
On the first limb of the test, the failure to fulfil the conditions for the performance of duties, the AG recognizes that Member States retain autonomy to define the conditions for holding office, such as qualifications, incompatibility rules, and integrity requirements (paras 85–88). However, he finds that this national autonomy is constrained: EU law provides that the conditions must be clearly defined in advance (para 89) and, where incompatibilities are enumerated in national law, such a list cannot be treated as exhaustive. Furthermore, a national framework that makes it impossible to address a conflict of interest not expressly listed in the law would itself be incompatible with EU law, since the absence of conflicts of interest is inherent in the independence requirement under Article 130 TFEU (paras 92–93). Finally, any decision that a failure to meet a condition justifies dismissal must comply with the principle of proportionality (para 89).
On the second limb, the finding of serious misconduct, the AG goes further, holding that there is no space for a national definition at all. “Serious misconduct” must be interpreted uniformly across Member States, by reference to its ordinary meaning, the objectives it serves, and the context of the provision (paras 95–96). The threshold cannot be set too low, because the dismissal of a national central bank governor necessarily affects the functioning of the ESCB. However, the threshold must retain adequate flexibility to capture conduct that seriously undermines either the institution’s capacity to perform its tasks or public confidence in its independence (paras 98–99). The assessment should be made on a case-by-case basis (para 100), and the AG explicitly rejects the ECB’s argument that a prior judicial determination is required, maintaining instead that the competent authority may assess misconduct itself, provided it respects the rights of defense of the individual (paras 149–151).
Applying this clarified test to the case at issue, the AG points out that under the Bulgarian legal framework, the KPK established an incompatibility, and the BNB’s Governing Council relied on that finding to conclude that the grounds for dismissal were met. However, once Bulgaria had incorporated Article 14.2 of the ESCB/ECB Statute into its own law by direct reference, the dismissal grounds became a matter of EU law (paras 67 and 75). The question is therefore not whether the Governing Council complied with the domestic procedure, but whether it applied the correct EU law standard when evaluating both grounds for removal.
On this point, the AG finds that Bulgaria fell short. Far from conducting its own assessment according to the requirements of EU law, the Governing Council rigidly adopted the KPK’s result (para 126). The problem cuts across both limbs of the removability test. The Governing Council treated the KPK’s incompatibility finding, first, as automatically establishing a failure to fulfil the conditions for performance of duties (the first limb), and second, as conclusive evidence of serious misconduct (the second limb). A rule of national law that compels the dismissing authority to treat another body’s findings as conclusive, without any autonomous evaluation, would amount to what the AG calls “rubberstamping”, and would defeat the logic of having autonomous grounds for dismissal in the first place (para 141). The domestic anti-corruption framework and the EU-law removability test may overlap, but they pursue different objectives and apply different standards. A finding under one framework cannot serve as an automatic proxy for a conclusion under the other framework (paras 141–143).
The AG’s proposed approach is remarkable but not necessarily novel per se. In his reasoning, the AG is essentially applying a structural logic to a guarantee of central bank independence under Article 14.2 of ESCB/ECB Statute that mirrors what the Court of Justice has done with judicial independence under Article 19(1) TEU.
In Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses, the Court of Justice was confronted with a Portuguese austerity law that temporarily reduced the salaries of public servants, including judges of the Tribunal de Contas (Court of Auditors). However, Article 19(1) TEU says nothing about judicial remuneration, disciplinary standards, or removal procedures. Yet, the Court held that the provision’s guarantee of effective judicial protection encompasses an independent requirement of judicial independence, binding on Member States in all fields covered by EU law, regardless of how their domestic law classifies the measure in question. In this way, the Court claimed jurisdiction to rule on this case, and decided that the salary cuts survived scrutiny on the merits only because they were temporary, driven by overriding budgetary necessity, and applied across the public sector rather than targeting judges specifically. In this landmark ruling, a general Treaty-level guarantee had generated concrete, substantive constraints on how Member States may treat their judges, even in the absence of any EU legislation governing their status.
When the Court of Justice treats an undefined Treaty term as an autonomous concept of EU law, it draws a line: Member States may act within the space the concept leaves open, but they do not get to define the concept itself. The technique is well-established in precedent. Whether it is “court or tribunal” under Article 267 TFEU, “worker” in free movement law, “undertaking” in competition law, each was left undefined in the Treaties, and each was filled with substantive content by the Court of Justice rather than by national legislatures.
The Influence Beyond Bulgaria
In this pending case, the autonomous concept is particularly effective. As a matter of fact, the proceedings were widely perceived as instrumentalized. Because of his previous background in the generally regarded pro-European party PP-DB (“We Continue the Change-Democratic Bulgaria”), Gurov was considered an opposition-linked figure, and the incompatibility finding was seen as an attempt to remove him from the candidate list for the caretaker Prime Minister. The perception gained further traction when, in February 2026, Gurov was in fact appointed caretaker PM by President Iliana Yotova under the newly amended Article 99 of the Bulgarian Constitution, the very provision introduced by the December 2023 constitutional amendments that made BNB governors and deputy governors eligible for that role.1 If the two limbs of the removability test were left to domestic definition, political forces in Bulgaria could effectively launder a politically motivated removal through a national administrative body’s classification, and the Article 14.2 safeguard would be hollowed out.
The Court of Justice has not yet delivered its judgment, and there is no guarantee it will follow the AG’s Opinion. Advocates General’s Opinions are influential but not determinative, and the Court may well chart a narrower course. But if the Court does adopt the autonomous concepts framework as proposed, the implications of its judgment will reach well beyond Bulgaria, and not all of them may be welcomed.
Consider Germany, for example. In 2010, the Executive Board of the Deutsche Bundesbank unanimously applied to the Federal President for the dismissal of Thilo Sarrazin, one of its own members, after a string of inflammatory public statements on immigration, ethnicity, and genetics that the institution considered damaging to its reputation and disruptive to its functioning. A senior German labor judge publicly doubted whether Sarrazin’s conduct met the legal threshold for removal, warning that private opinions unrelated to official duties may not constitute the required serious ground for dismissal. Sarrazin ultimately resigned before a formal decision was reached.
Had the AG’s framework been in place, the question of whether Sarrazin’s conduct amounted to “serious misconduct” may not have been for German law to answer at all, but an autonomous concept of EU law interpreted by the Court of Justice according to its own criteria. A Member State that concluded, through its own institutional assessment, that a board member’s repeated public provocations had made his position untenable might find that conclusion overridden by the Court of Justice applying a uniform EU-law threshold set primarily with monetary policy functions in mind. The space for national judgment about the professional standards expected of central bank officials would shrink accordingly.
Autonomous concepts, once established, cannot be easily rolled back. Member States then may only argue within the space the Court of Justice leaves open, but they lose the ability to contest the concept’s core content. It is for the Court of Justice to decide now whether to preserve the possibility of future calibration, or to foreclose it. For a precedent that will govern central bank governance across the Union, that choice most certainly matters.
