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Fairness or Uniformity: The Real Basis of the Duty to Give Reasons in Remling


On 24 March 2026, the European Court of Justice (“ECJ”) held in A. M. v Staatssecretaris van Justitie en Veiligheid (C-767/23) (“Remling”), that summary reasoning by a national court or tribunal of last instance to resolve a dispute will not suffice where such reasoning does not explain the grounds for which that national court or tribunal decides not to refer a question for a preliminary ruling, as provided by Article 267 TFEU. This “duty to give specific reasons” was first explained in Consorzio Italian Management (Case 561/19, para. 51). However, the ECJ has given the duty constitutional teeth in Remling, as it may now trump conflicting rules of national procedure.

Paragraph 3 of Article 267 TFEU states that where a question of interpretation of EU law or validity/interpretation of an EU act is necessary to resolve a dispute before any national court or tribunal of last instance, that court or tribunal must bring the matter before the ECJ. There are three situations where this is not required: (1) the question is irrelevant; (2) the EU law provision in question has already been interpreted by the ECJ (also called an “acte éclairé”); or (3) the correct interpretation of EU law is so obvious to leave no scope for any reasonable doubt (an “acte clair”) (see CILFIT (Case 283/81), paras 13 and 16).

The effect of Remling is that a national court must give specific reasons why one of these exceptions applies, even if a summary form of reasoning is permitted by national law. Now that the duty to give specific reasons is capable of outweighing national procedural rules, it is important to closer examine the justification for imposing this duty. Article 47 of the EU Charter (“CFREU”) provides two bases for the duty to give specific reasons, both of which are largely neglected in Remling. The first paragraph states that everyone has the right to an effective remedy regarding the rights and freedoms guaranteed by Union law. The second paragraph states that everyone is entitled to a fair hearing. In this context, the first paragraph bolsters the rights given by the second paragraph, as individuals have the right to their fair trial rights being protected.

The Advocate General Ćapeta’s Opinion in the case contains a helpful exposition of the right to a fair trial. Despite this, the ECJ grounds the duty to give specific reasons in the importance of the Article 267 TFEU preliminary ruling procedure for securing uniformity in EU law. Wrongfully, it will be argued, the ECJ’s decision only pays lip service to the rights-based justification for a duty to give specific reasons. Nevertheless, although the Opinion explores how the obligation to give reasons can be justified by Article 47 CFREU, it denies that even a rights-based justification can ground a general duty to give specific reasons, holding that this is case-specific (para. 86). Neither Remling nor its corresponding Opiniongo far enough – there is a general duty to give specific reasons, and it is grounded in rights-based rather than uniformity concerns.

The facts in Remling

A.M. was a third-country national, submitting to the national authorities that he was entitled to a derived right of residence in the Netherlands as the parent of Dutch minor under Article 20 TFEU. A.M.’s application was rejected, and upon several appeals, the case ended up before the referring court in this case, the Dutch Administrative Jurisdiction Division of the Council of State. The referring court considered it was not required to refer a question of interpretation of Article 20 TFEU, as the answer to A.M.’s question could be deduced from the ECJ’s previous case law and was therefore an “acte éclairé”. In accordance with the 2000 Dutch Law on foreign nationals, the referring court considered that it was permitted to provide a summary reasoning. It gave the following reasoning:

“The appeal does not result in the setting aside of the judgment [of the court of first instance]. There is no need to give further reasons for this finding.” (see Remling, para. 9).

Nevertheless, the referring court decided to make a reference to the ECJ not on the substance of the case but rather on the question of whether such a summary ruling was compatible with EU law, specifically with Article 267 TFEU, “read in light of Article 47 CFREU” (para. 17).

The ECJ’s judgment

The ECJ ruled that national procedural rules such as those in place in the Netherlands are incompatible with EU law. This means that, where national rules allow a national court or tribunal of last instance to provide summary reasoning when electing not to refer questions for a preliminary ruling, without explaining the reasons for this decision, these rules are incompatible with Article 267 TFEU (Remling, para. 32). Rather, summary reasoning must set out, “specifically and concretely”, why a CILFIT exception applies (para. 32), justifying the refusal to refer.

This obligation to state reasons is tempered by some reasonable qualifiers. The national court of last instance may state that it intends to rely on the same grounds relied on by a lower court for not referring (para. 33). Further, the court’s reasoning may be succinct if one of the first two CILFIT exceptions applies (paras. 35 and 36). However, where the third CILFIT exception applies, more detailed reasoning is required (para. 37).

Although this duty is not novel, Remling adds to Consorzio in two main respects. Firstly, Remling explains specifically the type of reasoning that must be given for each CILFIT exception, and so makes clear that the reasoning of the national judges may not be done in a purely summary manner. Secondly, and more significantly, Remling places the duty to give specific reasons as superior to a rule of national procedure, giving it new normative importance.

Advocate General Capeta’s Opinion

The approach taken in Advocate General Ćapeta’s Opinion differs from that of the ECJ. The Advocate General devotes more attention to both Articles 47 CFREU and 267 TFEU as distinct but complementary rationales for a duty to give specific reasons. However, her conclusion is that national courts need not be required to give specific reasoning as a general rule. Rather, she suggests that a balance must be struck between the interests of the national and EU legal systems, and thus that summary reasoning may be permissible in the circumstances (para. 64).

AG Ćapeta appears to have two reasons for concluding that there is only a context-specific duty to provide specific reasons under Article 47 CFREU. Firstly, European Court of Human Rights (“ECtHR”) case law (Baydar v. the Netherlands) has held that similar national legislation allowing summary reasoning is compatible with the corresponding right to a fair trial under Article 6(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights (“ECHR”). Secondly, as ECJ case law is clear that parties do not have an individual right for the national court to refer questions upon their request (CILFIT, para. 9), it may be more difficult to argue that they are owed an explanation where a referral is not made.

Although the AG’s exploration of Article 47 CFREU is useful, her discussion of Article 267 TFEU, and her conclusion that the duty is context-specific, will be challenged.

Why the duty to give specific reasons is not strictly grounded in Article 267 TFEU

The ECJ has repeatedly, and undesirably, blurred the boundary between Article 47 CFREU and Article 267 TFEU as justifications for the obligation to give specific reasons. This flaw is first seen in Consorzio, where the ECJ states that the need for a duty to give reasons comes from reading the substantive obligation to refer for a preliminary ruling, “in the light of the second paragraph of Article 47 CFREU” (para. 51). In Remling, the ECJ also states that the duty to give specific reasons follows from the obligation to refer itself, “read in light of” Article 47 CFREU (para. 38). However, what was tolerable in Consorzio now requires unpicking, in light of the duty’s impact on national legislation in Remling.

It may appear as though the way that Article 47 CFREU is mentioned is a question of semantics. However, by framing discussion in this way, the Court conflates the substantive rules dictating when questions must be referred, with the procedural rules dictating how the national court must present these decisions. And whilst the former puts us in the domain of ensuring the uniformity of EU law, the latter puts us in squarely in the remit of rights-based concerns. A duty to give specific reasons is not self-evident from the importance of Article 267 TFEU to the uniformity of the European legal order – the provision is relied upon more heavily than its scope and function allow for. The key benefits of the obligation to state reasons are ultimately those of transparency and procedural fairness, which go to the right to a fair trial and an effective judicial protection, not necessarily to the doctrinal coherence of EU law.

AG Ćapeta provides a more thorough reasoning in her Opinion on why the “obligation to reason” can be based on Article 267 TFEU. She argues that the uniformity objective is rooted in the public interest. According to the AG, such an “obligation to reason” secures the uniformity of EU law, and is thus in the public interest, as it encourages the national court to consider properly whether one of the CILFIT exceptions apply (paras. 44 and 47). However, it is at the very least questionable to what extent this holds true where, following Remling, a court does not provide reasons but simply refers to the previous reasoning of a lower court. If the point of the duty to give reasons is to protect the public interest by securing high-quality reasoning, then it would still be justified for the higher court to provide its own reasoning. In fact, Article 47 CFREU is a more sensible explanation for the rule that courts may rely on the lower court’s reasoning – the parties have already heard the reasoning, and the parties do not need to hear it again.

Even if giving reasons has the incidental benefit of improving the quality of a judgment, it is not, strictly speaking, necessary to achieve uniformity. Uniformity is ensured by the outcome of reasoning, not the reasoning itself. Therefore, all uniformity can require on its own is a duty to have reasons, not to give them necessarily (Opinion, para. 67). And for a judge to have reasons is a basic requirement of judicial decision-making, not an obligation uniquely conferred by Article 267 TFEU. One could counterargue here that, without giving reasons, the public cannot know whether the decision was made in its interest. But, if the aim is to allow the public to know that a decision aligns with its interest, then the underlying rationale for giving reasons is again not uniformity but fairness and transparency. Ultimately, thus, giving reasons is necessary to achieve fairness for the parties (and the wider public), suggesting that the right to a fair trial is a truer justification for the duty to give reasons.

Why the duty to give specific reasons is theoretically grounded in Article 47 CFREU

The ECJ may have observed that, in AG Ćapeta’s Opinion, relying on Article 47 CFREU as the basis for an “obligation to reason” led to the conclusion that there was only a duty to provide specific reasons where this was necessary for the parties to be heard in the case (Opinion, para. 76). The Court may have decided not to rely on Article 47 CFREU itself as it considered that it was not strong enough to establish a general duty. However, AG Ćapeta’s reasoning fails to appreciate that Article 47 CFREU is not necessarily coextensive with Article 6(1) ECHR, and that, because of Article 267 TFEU, Article 47 CFREU in fact requires a higher level of protection of the right to a fair trial.

Although Articles 6(1) ECHR and 47 CFREU are corresponding rights, nothing prevents Article 47 CFREU from requiring a higher level of rights protection (Article 52(3) CFREU). In fact, given that Article 47 CFREU exists within the broader context of EU law, in which referrals are mandated under Article 267 TFEU, it does require more. The decision of whether to refer implicates the parties to such an extent that providing specific reasons for not referring a question for preliminary ruling is required by the right to a fair trial, even if the parties have not requested a question be referred, and the obligation on national courts to refer is not owed to the parties individually. This is a fact the ECJ comes close to recognising in Remling itself, where it refers to a “right to have a question referred” (ibid., para. 28), in apparent tension with earlier case law. Even if there is no right to have a question referred, it is accepted in EU law in other contexts that a failure to refer may impact outcomes for individuals heavily. By way of more extreme example, a failure to refer is a breach of EU law, for which Member States may be liable to pay damages for an affected party (Kobler, Case 224/01). This right to redress implies that individuals have some legal interest in decisions for a preliminary reference being made correctly, and they are thus owed some reasoning independently of whether they requested the referral.

Thus, it is Article 47 CFREU, read within the context of Article 267 TFEU, that is the primary reason for the obligation to give specific reasons, regardless of whether the parties have requested that a question be referred for a preliminary ruling.

7.     Why reliance on Article 47 CFREU has normative and practical benefit

As it is a fundamental right, Article 47 CFREU is also a normatively better justification for interfering with national procedural rules than Article 267 TFEU, a more mechanical treaty provision governing when courts must refer.

Given that the burden is then on the EU system to justify its interference with national procedure (Rewe-Zentralfinanz,Case 33/76), a rights-based argument for the duty to give specific reasons, with its normative weight, would be more apt to give the EU legal position an edge over the Dutch one. The Dutch Law on Foreign Nationals is justified within the Dutch legal framework by its aim to secure uniformity of decisions, as summary reasoning eliminates variances in explanation (Remling, para. 9). Although it may be legally true that the uniformity of EU law should trump the uniformity of Dutch law, it is considerably easier to argue, both legally and morally, that fundamental rights trump Dutch national considerations.

The duty to give specific reasons being grounded in Article 47 CFREU also allows for more appropriate remedial action. If a failure to give reasons contravenes Article 267 TFEU primarily, then the remedy for this is structural infringement proceedings under Articles 258-60 TFEU. If it contravenes Article 47 CFREU, however, then an individual also has a rights-based claim. This has practical significance. For instance, in a hypothetical Köbler claim (although a failure to reason would have to meet a high threshold of breach to found a Köbler claim), it would be strained and indirect to characterise the national court’s culpable failure as a failure to ensure uniformity under Article 267 TFEU. The wrong in failing to reason is done to the individual, which the remedial framework should reflect.

Conclusion

The duty to give specific reasons is exclusively rooted in Article 47 CFREU, and not Article 267 TFEU. Failing to recognise this is a problem with earlier case law, but it is untenable if the duty is now used to strike down national procedural legislation.

The analytical problem in Remling is that it conflates two distinct obligations: the duty to have reasons, a pre-legal requirement of decision-making not imposed by Article 267 TFEU, and the duty to give reasons, a procedural requirement primarily owed to individuals. Article 267 TFEU has clear value in ensuring the uniformity of EU law. But, the duty to give specific reasons is founded in Article 47 CFREU, the right to a fair trial. If the ECJ had recognised this in Remling, it could have more accurately justified its encroachment on national procedural rules and established a more coherent basis for the duty in the future.

Cite this post (OSCOLA)

J Cejnar, 'Fairness or Uniformity: The Real Basis of the Duty to Give Reasons in Remling' (European Law Blog, 30 April 2026) https://europeanlawblog.eu/apoysqlf/ accessed 18 November 2026.