Skip to main content
Peter Swire 3 posts
  • Data Protection and Digital Governance

    EU/US Adequacy Negotiations and the Redress Challenge: How to Create an Independent Authority with Effective Remedy Powers

    Can the U.S. Government create, by non-statutory means, an independent redress authority capable of providing an effective remedy for a European person who believes that her or his rights have been infringed by an intelligence service? In this article we put forward a novel non-statutory solution that could resolve the “redress” problem in the EU/US adequacy negotiations. This solution is based on three “building blocks” inspired by methods utilized in U.S. administrative law. First, the U.S. Department of Justice should issue a binding regulation creating within that executive agency an independent “Foreign Intelligence Redress Authority” (FIRA). Second, the President should issue a separate Executive Order providing the necessary investigative powers and giving FIRA’s decisions binding effect across the intelligence agencies and other components of the U.S. government. Finally, European individuals could obtain judicial review of an independent redress decision by using the existing...

    University Grenoble Alpes Georgetown University Law School READ →
  • Data Protection and Digital Governance

    EU/US Adequacy Negotiations and the Redress Challenge: Whether a New U.S. Statute is Necessary to Produce an Essentially Equivalent Solution

    Must the U.S. Congress change statutory law to solve the major issue of “redress” in the EU-US adequacy negotiations? This is a crucial question, especially since a series of political, pragmatic and even legal/constitutional difficulties mean that the U.S. might not be able to come up with a short-term statutory solution for redress. In this article we analyse this question for the first time in detail, and argue that, provided the U.S. is able to address the deficiencies highlighted by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in its Schrems II judgment (independence of the redress body; ability to substantively review the requests; and authority to issue decisions that are binding on the intelligence agencies), then relying on a non-statutory solution could be compatible with the “essential equivalence” requirements of Article 45 of the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). In a second, forthcoming article, we set forth specific elements of a novel non-statutory...

    University Grenoble Alpes Georgetown University Law School READ →
  • Data Protection and Digital Governance

    The US, China, and Case C-311/18 on Standard Contractual Clauses

    On 9 July 2019, the Court of Justice for the European Union (CJEU) held eight hours of oral arguments in Case C-311/18, on whether US surveillance practices violate the fundamental rights of EU citizens. This case could potentially rupture the mechanisms that allow personal data to flow across the Atlantic. Should the Court so decide, it would soon be illegal for companies and services we use every day to transfer personal data from the EU to the US. Such a determination, however, may result in an absurdity; EU citizens’ data could not travel to the US for fear of intrusive surveillance, but could flow unimpeded to China, a nation with surveillance practices ripped from the pages of a dystopian science fiction novel. Although a cut-off of data flows may seem far-fetched, Austrian lawyer Max Schrems, the plaintiff in the case pending before the CJEU, won a similar earlier case in 2015 (previously discussed on this blog). That case concerned the EU/US “Safe Harbor,” the earlier version...

    READ →