A date in a trade mark may suggest an uninterrupted history, accumulated know-how and a reason to pay a premium. In Fauré Le Page (Case C-412/24), the CJEU held that a purported founding year may render a mark deceptive when the relevant public understands it as evoking long-standing know-how that guarantees the quality and prestige of the goods, although that know-how does not exist. The required connection is between the historical claim and the goods: consumers must understand the apparent age of the undertaking as a promise about the goods’ quality and prestigious image. A false statement about the undertaking alone falls outside this ground of invalidity of a trade mark. I agree with the CJEU’s conclusion in this case because it recognises that a historical claim can indeed convey a misleading promise about luxury goods. This conclusion, however, only works if there is an actual, demonstrated connection between the (false) date and the qualities consumers attribute to those goods.
The Dispute Behind the Date
The dispute concerned two French trade marks containing the sign “FAURÉ LE PAGE PARIS 1717” for luxury leather goods. The historical Maison Fauré Le Page had operated in Paris since 1716, initially trading in arms, ammunition and leather accessories, but was dissolved in 1992. A company incorporated in 2009 later acquired the earlier word mark “FAURÉ LE PAGE” and applied in 2011 for the marks containing “PARIS 1717”. Goyard, a competitor in the luxury leather-goods sector, sought a declaration of invalidity on the ground that the marks were deceptive.
The Paris Court of Appeal considered that the combination of “Paris” and “1717” conveyed continuity with the historical business and the transmission of its know-how. For consumers of luxury leather goods, centuries-old expertise could be perceived as a guarantee of quality and could influence the purchasing decision. The French Court of Cassation therefore asked whether false information about the proprietor’s age, reliability and know-how could amount to deception concerning an intangible characteristic of the goods.
The case was decided under Article 3(1)(g) of Directive 2008/95, which required refusal or invalidity where a mark was of such a nature as to deceive the public, for example as to the nature, quality or geographical origin of the goods or services. The materially identical rule now appears in Article 4(1)(g) of Directive (EU) 2015/2436 and, for EU trade marks, in Article 7(1)(g) of the EU Trade Mark Regulation. The Court’s interpretation therefore remains relevant under the current legislation.
What the Court Decided
The Court of Justice began with two established limits (paras 24–25). First, the misleading character must arise from the mark itself; the way in which the proprietor later uses or manages the mark is not part of the registration inquiry. Secondly, refusal or invalidity requires actual deception or a sufficiently serious risk of deception. The Court drew these requirements from W.F. Gözze Frottierweberei and Emanuel.
The Court then identified the legal limit of Article 3(1)(g) (paras 26–27): the deception must concern a characteristic of the goods or services. False information about the proprietor is not enough on its own. In particular, the place and date at which the proprietor was established are facts about the undertaking, not characteristics of the products it sells.
That limit did not end the analysis because the Court found that information about the undertaking may also convey a message about the goods (paras 28–30). A date understood as a distant founding year may evoke long-standing know-how. The relevant public may in turn regard that know-how as guaranteeing the quality of the goods and conferring a prestigious image on them. Referring to Copad, the Court recalled that, for luxury goods, quality includes not only material characteristics but also their allure and prestigious image. If the long-standing know-how evoked by the sign does not exist, the mark may therefore create the serious risk of deception required by the Directive.
The judgment does not establish that every inaccurate date is deceptive. Its operative part makes the conclusion conditional on how the relevant public perceives the sign: the number must be understood as a founding year; its remoteness must evoke long-standing know-how; that know-how must be perceived as guaranteeing quality and prestige; and the evoked know-how must not in fact exist. The national court must assess those elements in relation to the composite mark and the goods concerned.
From a Claim About the Undertaking to a Claim About the Goods
The central move in the judgment is from a statement about the undertaking to a perceived characteristic of the goods. A founding year initially describes the business. It falls within Article 3(1)(g) only when the relevant public understands the apparent longevity as communicating something about the goods themselves—here, long-standing know-how, a guarantee of quality and prestige (paras 27–30). This link preserves the wording of Article 3(1)(g), which is directed at goods and services, while allowing the provision to address an intangible quality claim conveyed by the sign.
That reasoning is particularly significant in the luxury sector. The Court treated prestige as part of the quality of luxury goods because their value may depend on allure and image as well as physical features (para 29, citing Copad). The point is not that an old date is inherently valuable or deceptive. It is that, for the goods at issue, the date may communicate expertise and prestige that consumers attribute to the products. In my view, applying that understanding of quality to deceptive marks is justified: a sign can misrepresent a luxury product’s prestige even where its physical workmanship is satisfactory. Requiring a defect in materials or manufacture would leave that message unexamined. The stronger objection is that age should not automatically be treated as evidence of prestige. The Court’s reasoning is persuasive only if the national court demonstrates that the date evokes long-standing know-how and that consumers understand that know-how as a guarantee of quality and prestige, rather than assuming that an old date is prestigious in itself.
The comparison with Emanuel clarifies the distinction. There, the transfer of a designer’s name together with the business did not by itself make the mark deceptive, because the mark did not necessarily promise the designer’s continuing personal involvement. In Fauré Le Page, the alleged deception arose from the message attributed to a new composite sign—name, place and year—and from the connection between that message and the quality of the goods. A change of ownership is therefore not decisive in itself; the decisive question is what the sign communicates to the relevant public.
Why the Luxury Context Matters
The Court’s reasoning is anchored in luxury leather goods. Paragraph 29 relies on Copad to explain why allure and prestigious image can form part of the quality of such goods. The judgment does not decide how a founding year should be treated in other sectors. Any extension beyond luxury goods would require the same statutory connection: the alleged historical message must be understood by the relevant public as conveying an identifiable characteristic of the particular goods or services.
This limitation matters because reputation and product quality are not interchangeable. A date may create a favourable impression without communicating better materials, methods, performance or another characteristic of the goods. In Fauré Le Page, prestige was relevant because the Court connected it specifically to the quality of luxury goods. The judgment therefore supports a contextual inquiry, not a general rule that every attractive historical association is a product characteristic.
The Risk of a General Truthfulness Test
The judgment’s flexibility also creates a risk of over-extension. Statements about a producer (e.g. family ownership, geographical roots or longevity) can often be associated with positive expectations about its products. If that association alone were sufficient, the requirement that deception concern a characteristic of the goods or services would lose the limiting function identified in paragraphs 26 and 27.
That would also blur the distinction between trade mark law and the broader law of misleading commercial practices. The Unfair Commercial Practices Directive addresses false or misleading information about matters including a trader’s attributes and product benefits in business-to-consumer practices. Article 4(1)(g) of the Trade Mark Directive has a narrower registration function: it prevents an inherently deceptive sign from being registered or remaining on the register. The consequence is the refusal or loss of an exclusive right, not merely control of a particular advertisement.
The seriousness threshold is therefore important. The Court repeated that there must be actual deception or a sufficiently serious risk of deception (para 25). Its operative part states that deception “may be inferred” only where the specified chain of perceptions is present. The formulation leaves the factual assessment to the national court and does not create a presumption that a fictitious old date necessarily communicates superior quality.
The distinction between registration and use provides a further limit. Paragraph 24 states that the inquiry concerns the mark as filed and that its subsequent management is irrelevant. A non-deceptive sign may be used in misleading advertising without thereby becoming inherently deceptive under Article 3(1)(g). Conversely, later explanatory advertising cannot necessarily cure a sign whose own message satisfies the conditions for deception. The registration inquiry must remain focused on the sign itself, considered as a whole and in relation to the relevant goods.
Evidence and Corporate Continuity
The judgment leaves the assessment of consumer perception and the existence of the evoked know-how to the national court. It does not prescribe consumer surveys or any other particular form of proof. Evidence must address what the composite sign conveys to the relevant public in relation to the goods concerned. The inaccuracy of a date, without evidence of the product-related message attributed to it, cannot establish the serious risk of deception identified by the Court (paras 25, 27–31).
The relevant inquiry concerns the meaning inherent in the sign at the legally relevant date (paras 24–25). A gap in trading activity or a change in corporate identity may help the court determine whether the long-standing know-how evoked by the mark exists. Neither fact, taken alone, shows that consumers understand the number as promising a characteristic of the goods. This distinction also allows the court to consider evidence of genuine, transmitted know-how despite a change in legal ownership.
Brand Revivals and Trade Mark Transfers
The ruling should not be read as making a trade mark inseparable from the original undertaking. Article 20(1) of the EU Trade Mark Regulation expressly permits an EU trade mark to be transferred independently of the undertaking. The Court did not question the lawfulness of acquiring a dormant mark. The potential problem arises from a later sign that, viewed as a whole, communicates non-existent product-related continuity through a founding year.
The judgment itself does not lay down due-diligence duties or drafting rules for revived brands. A practical implication can nevertheless be drawn from its holding: a purchaser intending to place a historical date in a new composite mark should be able to assess what that date is likely to communicate and whether the know-how it evokes can be substantiated. This is an implication of the Court’s test, not an additional rule stated in the judgment.
The same contextual difficulty affects examination. A number may appear neutral in isolation but acquire a historical meaning when combined with a place name, a brand and particular goods. The judgment therefore calls for assessment of the sign as a whole and through the perception of the relevant public. It does not support speculation about every possible association with age; the conditions identified in the operative part must be met.
Conclusion
Fauré Le Page reaches a defensible interpretation of Article 3(1)(g). Where a founding year conveys a false promise of inherited expertise, excluding that message merely because it begins with the undertaking’s history would overlook what the sign tells consumers about the goods. I therefore agree with the Court’s recognition that deception may concern the basis of quality and prestige in the luxury sector, even without a false claim about a product’s physical composition.
That conclusion depends on preserving the limit at the centre of the judgment. Historical appeal alone should not justify invalidity: the assessment must explain how the sign evokes know-how that consumers regard as a guarantee of the goods’ quality and prestige, and why that know-how does not exist. A change of ownership or a break in trading cannot substitute for that analysis. Applied with this discipline, the judgment can protect consumers against a false promise of inherited expertise while leaving room for legitimate brand revivals. If national courts collapse those steps into a general assumption that older automatically means better, they risk turning a defined ground of invalidity into the broader truthfulness test that the judgment in Fauré Le Page itself rejects.
