Category: Economic and Monetary Union

Pending before the European Court of Justice (ECJ) is a core issue of legal protection against European Union (EU) acts – can a bank itself challenge the withdrawal of its license by the European Central Bank (ECB) even when the powers of the bank’s board have been taken over by a liquidator, or can the shareholders act for the bank or, alternatively, for the protection of their own interests?

Three years since the ECB withdrew the license of a Latvian bank, Trasta Komercbanka, in March 2016, this issue of effective judicial protection is at the centre of proceedings[1] in which the Advocate General (AG)’s Opinion is just out. This post sketches the background to the on-going proceedings and summarises the AG’s Opinion, highlighting the issue of contestation of withdrawal of a bank’s license: who can challenge the ECB in court: the bank’s board, side-lined by the liquidator, or its shareholders? Continue reading →

March 5, 2019

ECJ annuls a national measure against an independent central banker

By René Smits

Case C‑202/18 (Ilmārs Rimšēvičs v Republic of Latvia) and Case C‑238/18 (European Central Bank v Republic of Latvia); Opinion of AG Kokott of 19 December 2018, ECLI:EU:C:2018:1030; judgment of the Court of 26 February 2019, ECLI:EU:C:2019:139.

A recent judgment of the ECJ underlined the increasing interweaving of EU law and national law in the area of central bank law, not only in substantive matters but, also procedurally. In the first cases since the provision providing for this anomaly was inserted in the Treaty[1] in 1993, the ECJ confirmed that review of a national legal act affecting the independence of the monetary authority lies with the European Court of Justice. Normally, only legal acts of EU institutions, bodies, offices and agencies can be challenged before the CJEU (Article 263 TFEU); national legal acts with an EU law connotation may come before the CJEU through a reference for a preliminary ruling (Article 267 TFEU) or in infringement proceedings (Article 258 TFEU). Admittedly, this is a singular and exceptional case as it concerns review of a Member State measure by which a Governor of a National Central Bank (NCB) is “relieved from office”. Together with the Executive Board of the European Central Bank (ECB), NCB Governors in the Eurosystem[2] form the ECB’s Governing Council, which has ultimate decision-making power[3] for monetary policy in the Euro Area[4]. Since monetary policy is an exclusive Union competence[5], at least for the <in> Member States[6], to be pursued in independence[7], the Court found that it has jurisdiction to assess the legality of a measure that interferes with an NCB Governor performing his functions and annulled the relevant national decision in so far as it prohibits the Governor from performing his duties as NCB Governor. There is more that’s exceptional about this case: alleged corruption at a central bank, allegations of money laundering and of a misinformation campaign…..

Continue reading →

December 5, 2018

The Pilatus Bank scandal: time to reconsider banking supervision, anti-money laundering and whistle-blower’s protection in the EU

By Dimitrios Kafteranis

On Monday 23 April 2018, the European Commission released its proposal on the protection of persons reporting on breaches of Union law. The proposal of the European Commission comes after pressure of the European Parliament and other organisations calling for a coherent protection of whistle-blowers at the EU level. This pressure results partially from different scandals that were revealed by whistle-blowers such as Panama Papers or the case of the Pilatus Bank in Malta. The Commission’s proposal aims to set common minimum standards to protect whistle-blowers when they report breaches of EU law. It has several legal bases and covers a wide-range of EU areas such as consumer protection, financial services and the protection of privacy and data. The reporting procedure follows the ‘classic’ three-tier model for whistle-blowing, that is reporting firstly internally, then to the designated authorities and as a last solution to the public. The text is innovative in the sense that it proposes a wide definition of the whistle-blower ranging from trainees to ex-employees. The European Commission regards whistle-blowing as an enforcement tool for the prevention, detection and prosecution of illegalities affecting EU law.

For the future, it is compelling to pursue the negotiations between the two co-legislators of the EU (European Parliament and Council) in order to follow the challenges on the question of whistle-blowing at the national and European level. These negotiations could take many years. This post aims to introduce the reader to the proposal for a Directive on the protection of whistle-blowers by cross-referring to the case of the Pilatus Bank where a journalist and a whistle-blower are involved. The purpose is to highlight that there is a need for an EU Directive on the protection of whistle-blowers and to demonstrate that the proposed EU Directive would have better protected the Pilatus Bank whistle-blower. Furthermore, this contribution will demonstrate the problematic nature of money laundering and banking supervision at the EU level. Following the creation of the Banking Union, the interconnectivity of banks is a fact and a problem in one country can create a domino effect to the others. For example, the Pilatus Bank scandal does not only concern Malta but the European banking system as a whole. Continue reading →

April 9, 2018

How to Bring It Home – The EU’s Options for Incorporating the Fiscal Compact into EU Law

By Johannes Graf von Luckner

From North to South, from national governments to the Commission: EU Institutions and Member States are in agreement that a reform of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) is high on the political agenda. One aspect of such a reform is the integration of the Fiscal Compact into the EU legal framework, which the Member States committed to in the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union (TSCG). With a French Government that is pushing for reforms, a German government that is finally in place, and a proposal for a directive drafted by the EU Commission on the table, it is likely that the topic will gain importance.

In three somewhat distinct steps, this post aims to explain the obligation to incorporate the Fiscal Compact into EU law (1.), explore one viable option to do so, which some of the treaty-drafters might have had in mind, namely the Enhanced Cooperation mechanism (2.), and analyse the (rather surprising) Commission proposal on the topic (3.). Continue reading →

December 15, 2017

Neues aus dem Elfenbeinturm: December 2017

Conference “Constitutional Challenges in the EMU: the New Instruments of European Economic Governance”

Brussels, 29-30 March 2018. Deadline for abstract submissions: 15 January 2018.

International Electoral Observers Training

European Inter-University Centre for Human Rights and Democratisation, Venice, 19-24 March 2018. Deadline for registration: 15 February 2018.

Conference “Economic Constitutionalism: Mapping its Contours in European and Global Governance”

European University Institute, 14-15 June 2018. Deadline for abstract submissions: 28 February 2018.

Conference “Upgrading Trade and Services in EU and International Economic Law”

Radboud University, Nijmegen, 15 June 2018. Deadline for abstract submissions: 16 March 2018.

Call for papers: Utrecht Journal of International and European Law

Deadline for submissions: 9 April 2018.

October 2, 2017

Cases C-643 and C-647/15: Enforcing solidarity in EU migration policy

By Daniela Obradovic

The duty of solidarity between EU Member States

Although the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) long ago characterised the deliberate refusal of a Member State to implement EU law as a ‘failure in the duty of solidarity’ that ‘strikes at the fundamental basis’ of the EU legal order (Case 39/72, para. 25), it has not been clear whether the principle of solidarity among Member States can be enforced in European courts. The recent response of the CJEU to the Slovakian and Hungarian challenge (C-643 and C-647/15, the migrant quotas verdict) to the Council decision on the relocation of migrants from Italy and Greece (the relocation decision) seems to establish that the principle of solidarity between Member States in the area of EU immigration policy can be a source of EU obligations susceptible to judicial enforcement. Continue reading →

August 22, 2016

Neues aus dem Elfenbeinturm: August 2016

PhD Forum “Law and Governance in a Crisis-Ridden Union”

Netherlands Institute for Law and Governance, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, 17 November 2016. Deadline for abstract submissions : 4 September 2016.

Call for papers “The Migration Crisis as a Challenge for Democracy”

Centre for Direct Democracy Studies, University of Białystok. Deadline for abstract submissions : 10 September 2016.

March 21, 2016

POMFR: What form of government for the European Union and the Eurozone? (Fabbrini et al, eds.; Hart Publishing 2015).

By Daniela Jaros

A couple of months ago, an interesting volume edited by Federico Fabbrini, Ernst Hirsch Ballin and Han Somsen entitled „What form of government for the European Union and the Eurozone?“ appeared on the EU law book market. Containing contributions of many renowned scholars of EU law and EU politics, it seeks to explore the impact of the Euro-crisis on the institutional setting, the distribution of competences and the balance of power as well as issues of legitimacy and accountability within the Eurozone and ultimately within the European Union. Continue reading →

March 18, 2016

Neues aus dem Elfenbeinturm: March 2016

Jean Monnet Doctoral Workshop “Interactions Between European Union and International Law”

City University London, 23 June 2016. Deadline for abstract submission: 25 March 2016.

Conference “Boosting the Enforcement of EU Competition Law at Domestic Level”

Radboud University Nijmegen, 3 June 2016. Deadline for abstract submissions: 31 March 2016.

Workshop “The Disintegration of Europe”

Hertie School of Governance, Berlin, 30-31 May 2016. Deadline for abstract submissions: 1 April 2016.

Seminar “Transnational Solidarity: Setting the Boundaries”

Center for Transnational Legal Studies, London, 1 April 2016. (Free) registration needed.

Conference “Environmental Rights in Europe and Beyond”

Lund, 21-22 April 2016. (Free) registration needed.

Conference “Existe-t-il encore un seul non bis in idem aujourd’hui?”

University of Nancy, 28 April 2016. Registration needed.

Vienna Journal on International Constitutional Law Conference 2016

Vienna University of Economics and Business, 23 September 2016. Deadline for abstract submissions: 15 May 2016. Continue reading →

February 18, 2016

Neues aus dem Elfenbeinturm: February 2016

Conference “The European Convention on Human Rights and the Crimes of the Past”

European Court of Human Rights, Strasbourg, February 26 2016. Deadline for registration: 19 February 2016.

Conference “Searching for Solidarity in EU Asylum and Border Policies”

Brussels, 26-27 February 2016. (Paid) registration needed.

Conference “Reforms in UN Treaty Bodies and the European Court of Human Rights: Mutual Lessons?”

University of Oslo, 29 February 2016. (Free) registration needed.

Conference “Mapping the challenges in economic and financial criminal law: a comparative analysis of Europe and the US”

University of Luxembourg, 17 March 2016. (Free) registration needed.

Workshop “Austerity and Law in Europe”

University of Amsterdam, 16-17 June 2016. (Free) registration needed.

EUI Summer Courses on Human Rights and on the Law of the European Union

European University Institute, Florence, 20 June-1 July/4-15 July 2016. Deadline for applications: 4 April 2016.

Conference “Adjudicating international trade and investment disputes: between interaction and isolation”

University of Oslo, 25-26 August 2016. Deadline for abstract submissions: 1 March 2016.

December 17, 2015

Neues aus dem Elfenbeinturm: December 2015

Workshop „The Age of Austerity: A New Challenge for State Powers“

University of Edinburgh, 30 March 2016. Deadline for abstract submissions: 20 December 2015.

CJICL Conference „Public and Private Power“

University of Cambridge, 8-9 April 2016. Deadline for abstract submissions: 10 January 2016.

Workshop „The preliminary reference procedure as a compliance mechanism of EU environmental law“

Brussels, 17 June 2016. Deadline for abstract submissions: 15 January 2016.

Conference „Building Consensus on European Consensus“

European University Institute, Florence, 1-2 June 2016. Deadline for abstract submissions: 31 January 2016.

Doctoral Colloquium „Responsibility in International and European Law, Philosophy and History“

University of Fribourg, 11-12 November 2016. Deadline for abstract submissions: 1 March 2016.

EELF Conference „Procedural Environmental Rights: Principle X in Theory and Practice“

Wrocław University, 14-16 September 2016. Deadline for abstract submissions: 15 March 2016.

Conference „Intra-EU BITs and Intra-EU Disputes“

University of Vienna, 7 March 2016. (Paid) registration needed.

September 18, 2015

Neues aus dem Elfenbeinturm: September 2015

Conference “The European Union as an Actor in International Economic Law”

University of Luxembourg, 1-2 October 2015. Deadline for registration: 30 September 2015.

Conference “Criminal Justice: Jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice – Today and Future”

Court of Justice of the European Union, 2-3 October 2015. (Paid) registration required.

Inaugural CMLRev Conference “Membership of the Union and Membership of the Euro”

University of Liverpool, 9 October 2015. (Free) registration required.

Workshop “Mutual Legal Assistance in the Digital Age: Problems, Challenges, Solutions for Criminal Justice”

University of Luxembourg, 15 October 2015. (Free) registration required.

Workshop “A balanced data protection in the EU: conflicts and possible solutions”

UM Campus Brussels, University of Maastricht, 19 October 2015. (Paid) registration required.

Conference “Migration Policy in the European Union – Current Challenges and Future Developments”

University of Luxembourg, 22-23 October 2015.

Call for submissions for the 2016 edition of the Hibernian Law Journal

Deadline for submissions: 31 October 2015.

EIUC Training for International Electoral Observers

Monastery of San Nicolò, 23-28 November 2015. Deadline for application: 30 October 2015.

Workshop “Victims in Europe – Needs, Rights, Perspectives”

University of Luxembourg, 16 November 2015.

Colloquium “The Environment in Court – Environmental Protection in National and International Courts, Tribunals, and Compliance Mechanisms”

PluriCourts, University of Oslo, 20-25 June 2016. Deadline for abstract submissions: 15 January 2016.

July 30, 2015

Neues aus dem Elfenbeinturm: July 2015

Conference “The Democratic Principle and the Economic and Monetary Union”

University of Rome – Tor Vergata, 22 January 2016. Deadline for abstract submissions: 30 September 2015.

Conference “General Principles of Law: European and Comparative Perspectives”

University of Oxford, 25-26 September 2015. No deadline for registration.

Call for Papers “Intellectual Property in International and European Law ”

Utrecht Journal of International and European Law. Deadline for submissions: 15 October 2015.

March 19, 2015

How Strict is “Strict Conditionality”? The New Eurozone Agreement on Greece

By Michael Ioannidis

Few elections have as their core issue an international arrangement. The Greek election of 25 January 2015 was one of these exceptions. In 2010 and 2012, Greece agreed with its Eurozone partners and the IMF to accept two large bailout packages conditioned on the fulfilment of far-reaching, austerity-oriented reforms. It also agreed to submit to a monitoring mechanism comprised by officials from the European Commission, the IMF, and the ECB that would supervise its compliance with the conditions and regularly revise them. This monitoring and rule-making structure became known as the Troika.

The second of the bailout agreements, concluded in 2012, was due to expire on 28 February 2015. Unlike Portugal or Ireland, Greece had not established access to the bond market by the end of its Adjustment Programme. Ending international financing support at the end of February would thus possibly prompt a Greek default. What the next step after the expiry of the 2012 bailout programme should be was put to a national vote on 25 January.

This post will offer an overview of the recent major developments concerning the Greek part of the Eurozone crisis. It will discuss how the Greek government tried to challenge basic elements of the new European economic governance and the outcome of this challenge. In the first part of the post, I present the starting position of the new Greek government (1.), then the legal and political context in which the negotiations took place (2.), and finally the agreement of 20 February 2015 (3.). In my conclusion, I take the position that opponents of austerity should wait to celebrate a victory. “Strict conditionality”, the necessary counterpart of financial assistance according to EU law, proved to be much stricter than many actors thought, both in economic and institutional terms (4.). Continue reading →

February 27, 2015

The AG’s opinion on the Outright Monetary Transactions Case

By Daniela Jaros

On January 14, Advocate General (AG) Cruz-Villalón issued his opinion in the reference for a preliminary ruling on Gauweiler et al. v Deutscher Bundestag on the ECB’s Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT). The OMT Programme launched in September 2012 was part of a series of measures taken by the ECB in response to the Euro crisis accompanying the loan facilities (European Financial Stability Facility – EFSF, European Stability Mechansim – ESM).

The German Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht, “BVerfG”) had asked the Court of Justice (CJEU) two questions in what it classified as an ultra vires review of acts of the European Union. Roughly speaking, the BVerfG wanted to check whether the European Central Bank (ECB) had transgressed the limits of its powers derived from the treaties. If the ECB had, this would have consequences for the constitutional identity of Germany. Therefore, the BVerfG first wanted clarification on whether the Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) Programme was an economic rather than a monetary measure and whether the ECB had therefore exceeded its powers by establishing it. Second, the BVerfG raised the question whether the OMT programme was not violating the prohibition of monetary financing of Member State. Continue reading →

February 17, 2015

Neues aus dem Elfenbeinturm: February 2015

Conference : 22nd St. Gallen International Competition Law Forum

University of St. Gallen, 23-24 April 2015.

Call for Papers: Conference “The State and/of Comparative Law”

University of Limerick, 2-4 June 2015. Deadline for abstract submissions: 28 February 2015.

Call for Papers: 50 Year Anniversary of Cahiers de droit européen – “General Principles of European Union Law”

Brussels, 10 September 2015. Deadline for summary presentations submissions: 1 March 2015. Continue reading →

November 13, 2014

Will the Juncker Commission initiate unified Eurozone external representation?

By Chris Koedooder

As the response to the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis has shown, when push comes to shove, EU Member States are willing to accept a further transfer of powers to the European level. However, they are – understandably – not so keen on reforms that diminish their international stature. The long overdue consolidation of the Eurozone’s external representation, identified as one of the building blocks of a ‘genuine’ Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), was perpetually delayed under the Barroso Commission. EU Member States, it appears, are still not ready to accept this particular curtailment of their powers. This raises the question whether the new Juncker Commission will be able to seal the deal fifteen years after the Eurozone came into existence. Continue reading →

April 22, 2014

Completing the Banking Union

By Barbera Reisenhofer and Daniela Jaros

While the Eurozone crisis started as banking crisis which turned into a sovereign debt crisis simultaneously leading to the crisis of the monetary union, the first measures taken (bilateral loans to Greece, the EFSF, the ESM, the ECB’s SMP and later OMTs, the Six-Pack and the TSCG) were primarily meant to stabilize and contain the ongoing crisis. The Banking Union, however, completed through the recent agreement on the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM), is a further, forward-looking step. More than to contain, it is meant to prevent crises of the kind just experienced. It has rightly been described as the most ambitious integration project since the creation of the single currency as it leads to its members transferring the control of their biggest banks to the supranational level.

The Banking Union consists of two pillars – the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) and the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM). Continue reading →

February 19, 2014

The German Federal Constitutional Court on Outright Monetary Transactions by the European Central Bank – pressing the CJEU or a friendly gesture?

On Friday, February 7^th, 2014, the German Federal Constitutional Court (BVerfG) requested the CJEU for preliminary ruling for the first time. The request is exceptional in terms of both European Union law and German constitutional law. Commentators call the decision a Spring in the Desert, a Golden Bridge to Luxembourg or simply put Historic. The BVerfG stated its opinion throughout several decisions regarding fundamental questions between the European Union and its Member States (e.g. Solange I, Solange II, Maastricht, Lisbon), but always abstained from requesting a preliminary ruling. This time, however, the BVerfG indeed submitted a question. The stakes in the case are high, as the BVerfG considers giving an ultra vires ruling regarding a decision by the Governing Council of the European Central Bank (ECB) concerning Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) unless the CJEU announces that that decision is partially incompatible with primary law or restricts its scope. If the “conditions” laid out by the BVerfG are not met by the CJEU, the decision on OMT will be declared incompatible with the German constitution. The consequence would be that German authorities would not be bound to the decision by the ECB. In other words, the German central bank with around 18 % in capital subscriptions (shares) of the ECB would not participate in OMTs. Continue reading →

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