“There is a war, right?” This rhetorical question is the fundamental concern that animates the proposal by von Bogdandy and Spieker to limit Hungary’s veto power in relation to the adoption of sanctions by the European Union concerning Russia in the wake of the latter’s continued war of aggression against Ukraine (see here for the original proposal, a critique and a rejoinder).
Von Bogdandy and Spieker take the position that a continued, serious breach of the values outlined in Article 2 TEU can, in exceptional circumstances, lead to the irrelevancy of a Member State’s veto in European Council votes (hereafter: the values exception). The authors are refreshingly straightforward when it comes to the philosophical basis of their argument: “[p]articularly in existential situations, the Union is expected to defend, ‘within its mandate’, the European society with ‘whatever it takes’.”
Van den Brink and Dawson disagree with their proposal: they consider the values exception to be “fantastical” and “dangerous”, far removed from the “original rules and standards” of interpretation. As both sides have outlined in their opposing positions, it is fruitful to reflect on the rich historical lineage of this debate. After all, the dispute between von Bogdandy/Spieker, on the one hand, and their critics, on the other, reflects a question that divided lawyers for centuries: what is the role of law in an emergency?
The Law during Emergencies
There are two classic archetypes of the legal response to such crises:
1) The “whatever it takes” faction follows an instrumental outlook: the law is there to serve certain purposes or values. If a particular rule becomes destructive to these ends, then it may be appropriate to outright disregard it or at least reduce its ambit. “Creative” and “bold” approaches to legal interpretation are favored. The constitution is seen as a living organism, constantly subject to change. Common instruments in the toolbox of the “whatever it takes” lawyer are teleological interpretation and reduction, appeals to the necessities of current circumstances and warnings of the dire consequences of sticking to a literal interpretation of the law. Phrases like “The Constitution is not a suicide pact” are frequently employed.
2) On the other side are lawyers subscribing to the “the rules are the rules” view. This position tends to be undergirded by a more formalist understanding of law. As Schauer argued, “it is exactly a rule’s rigidity, even in the face of applications that would ill serve its purpose, that renders it a rule”. The role of constitutional law as a binding constraint on political actors is emphasized. Typical arguments of this camp are appeals to textual/grammatical interpretation of legal documents and warnings of the unintended consequences of proposed exceptions to established rules. “What if the other side of the political spectrum would use these same arguments to advance their goals?” is a recurring rhetorical tool of this faction.
A memorable illustration of these two positions can be found in the iconic back-and-forth between William Roper and Thomas More in Robert Bolt’s play A Man for All Seasons:
“Roper: So now you’d give the Devil benefit of law!
More: Yes. What would you do? Cut a great road through the law to get after the Devil?
Roper: I’d cut down every law in England to do that!
More: Oh? And when the last law was down, and the Devil turned round on you where would you hide, Roper, the laws all being flat? This country’s planted thick with laws from coast to coast – Man’s laws, not God’s – and if you cut them down – and you’re just the man to do it – d’you really think you could stand upright in the winds that would blow then?
Yes, I’d give the Devil benefit of law, for my own safety’s sake.”
The relative strength of these positions ebbs and flows: at the height of a given crisis, “whatever it takes” lawyers tend to dominate. But as normalcy returns or is seen to return, a certain uneasiness with the deviation from traditional rules of interpretation often emerges. As a result, lawyers try to quarantine the legal constructions that were employed during the emergency – with varying degrees of success.
The Law at War
These two archetypes appear with remarkable regularity whenever a new generation is confronted with the horrors of war: they can be seen in debates around the use of military tribunals to try civilians during the US Civil War (see Ex parte Milligan), the suppression of dissent during World War I (see Schenck v. US and Debs v. US), ethnically based internment during World War II (see below) and, more recently, the legality of the Global War on Terror (see the Belmarsh case and Boumediene v. Bush).
Two court decisions that dealt with the legality of drastic (to say the least) measures taken during the extraordinary challenges of World War II are particularly revealing for the current discussion: Liversidge v. Anderson (1941) in the UK and Korematsu v. US (1944) in the US.
In Liversidge v. Anderson (1941), the Judicial Committee of the UK House of Lords had to decide whether internments on the basis of “hostile origin or associations” were subject to judicial scrutiny. In the decision – just months after the Blitz – the majority of the Law Lords held that, while the ordinary rules of interpretation would favor the liberty of the individual, allowances had to be made for the grave threat to national safety (p. 218 f.). Instead of requiring an objective basis to justify the internment, the mere “personal belief” of the Secretary of State was considered sufficient (p. 224, 264). The parallels to the current debate shine through especially clearly in Lord Romer’s summation: “we are dealing here with an Act passed and regulations made under it in times of a great national emergency, and in view of this circumstance and of the objects which that Act and those regulations so plainly had in view, the courts should, in my opinion, prefer that construction which is the least likely to imperil the safety of this country.” (p. 280)
The sole voice of dissent in arguing against the departure from established legal methodology was Lord Atkin: “[i]n England, amidst the clash of arms, the laws are not silent. They may be changed, but they speak the same language in war as in peace” (p. 244). Lord Atkin accentuated this critique of his colleagues’ approach with a biting reference to the novel Through the Looking-Glass by Lewis Carroll:
“I know of only one authority which might justify the suggested method of construction. ‘When I use a word,’ Humpty Dumpty said, in rather a scornful tone, ‘it means just what I choose it to mean, neither more nor less.’ ‘The question is,’ said Alice, ‘whether you can make words mean so many different things.’ ‘The question is,’ said Humpty Dumpty, ‘which is to be the master, that’s all.’” (p. 245)
A similar situation presented itself to the United States Supreme Court in Korematsu v. US (1944). The case concerned the internment of Japanese Americans by the Roosevelt administration following the attack on Pearl Harbor. The majority held that the measures were constitutionally valid as they were based on “pressing public necessity” and not “racial antagonism” (p. 216). The Supreme Court acknowledged the deviation that such internments presented from the regular constitutional order but stressed that “when, under conditions of modern warfare, our shores are threatened by hostile forces, the power to protect must be commensurate with the threatened danger” (p. 220). Of the nine-member court, three dissented. Justice Jackson’s dissent is of particular relevance, for it revealed both the discriminatory nature of the program and the danger of judicially legitimizing it:
“[O]nce a judicial opinion rationalizes such an order to show that it conforms to the Constitution, or rather rationalizes the Constitution to show that the Constitution sanctions such an order, the Court for all time has validated the principle of racial discrimination in criminal procedure and of transplanting American citizens. The principle then lies about like a loaded weapon, ready for the hand of any authority that can bring forward a plausible claim of an urgent need. Every repetition imbeds that principle more deeply in our law and thinking and expands it to new purposes.” (p. 246)
Can the Values Exception be Contained?
What insights can be drawn from these examples? First, legal exceptions made in times of emergency are often subject to harsh revision by future generations of lawyers: the dissents and not the majority decisions are now widely considered to be the controlling precedents for both Liversidge and Korematsu. Chief Justice Roberts has famously described the majority’s approach in the latter as “overruled in the court of history”. But these new perspectives tend to emerge only after a significant passage of time, throughout which the exceptions can exercise their compromising influence on the legal order.
Second, these cases reveal the difficulty of accommodating radical methodological departures within the ordinary architecture of law. They have been described as “legal black holes”, not just for their position outside of the law but also for their propensity of sucking in and corrupting their surroundings. After all, there is a “tendency of a principle to expand itself to the limit of its logic”, as Cardozo explained.
Von Bogdandy and Spieker have a response to this concern: they emphasize the “narrow and context-specific” nature of their proposal directed at “particularly serious” breaches of the values outlined in Article 2 TEU. Only when confronted with “existential threats to the Union’s peace, its values, and the well-being of its peoples” could the values exception be employed and then only with reference to that particular vote. The Member State’s veto power in other domains would remain untouched.
There are reasons to be skeptical of these assurances. Von Bogdandy and Spieker consider constitutional law to be a “living instrument”. This methodological approach allows them to fashion the values exception. But it contains, of course, also the ready potential to broaden the exception far beyond the designs of its originators. Indeed, expanding the values exception would be a much smaller leap of legal imagination than creating it in the first place.
And the incentive to do so for enterprising politicians and lawyers is abundant: the values exception could be applied not only to less serious breaches of Article 2 TEU but also to other kinds of procedural rules and to other organs of the EU constitutional order. The authors advance such a possibility themselves: in “highly exceptional circumstances”, the values exception could be used to justify a change in Council voting rules from unanimity to mere qualified majority. After all, procedural provisions cannot be allowed to frustrate “the Union’s agency in the face of existential threats”, they argue.
With such a starting point, even the refusal of the European Parliament to pass a piece of legislation – perhaps one considered vital for the defense of the Union – could be declared legally irrelevant. This may seem far-fetched but we should consider the warning of Ní Aoláin and Gross in their rather comprehensive study of law in times of crises: “[a]s the boundaries of normalcy and exception are redefined and reshaped, the previously unthinkable may transform into the thinkable.”
In short: a methodological revolution centered on the necessities of protection from external threats is incapable of being contained by safeguards framed in the language of regular law, like the requirement of a particularly serious and repeated breach of Article 2 TEU. The very same arguments that give rise to the values exception will be ready to justify its expansion.
