Few disputes have made so much doctrine out of so little sound. The litigation now known as Pelham began with an approximately two-second rhythm sequence taken from Kraftwerk’s Metall auf Metall and used, in looped form, in Sabrina Setlur’s Nur mir. What might once have seemed a provincial quarrel over musical borrowing has, after decades of litigation before German courts, the Bundesverfassungsgericht, and the Court of Justice, become one of the more revealing sites at which EU copyright law confronts the cultural fact of reuse: namely, that art is often made not by standing apart from prior works, but by returning to them, quoting them, distorting them, answering them, and sometimes allowing them to survive in altered form.
On 14 April 2026, the Grand Chamber delivered its judgment in CG and YN v. Pelham GmbH and Others (C-590/23) (hereinafter “Pelham II”), interpreting the concept of “pastiche” under Article 5(3)(k) of Directive 2001/29/EC. That provision permits Member States to create exceptions or limitations allowing the use of copyright-protected works or protected subject matter “for the purpose of caricature, parody or pastiche.” In ordinary usage, pastiche refers to a work that imitates, borrows from, or combines elements of earlier works or styles, often without the mocking quality associated with parody. Unlike parody, which had already received authoritative treatment in Deckmyn and Vrijheidsfonds, pastiche had long remained a somewhat spectral term in EU copyright law: present in the Directive, placed beside two familiar neighbouring concepts, but lacking an independent grammar of its own.
The Court’s answer is deceptively compact. Pastiche, it held, covers the use of characteristic elements of an existing work or protected subject matter where the new work evokes that earlier material, remains noticeably different from it, and engages with it in a form of artistic or creative dialogue recognisable as such (Pelham II, para. 58). Moreover, it is not necessary that the user subjectively intended to create a pastiche, since what matters is that the pastiche character be objectively recognisable to a person familiar with the work from which the material has been borrowed (Pelham II, paras 61-62). In this formulation, the Court does not define pastiche by humour, mockery, stylistic imitation, tribute, genre, or quantity taken. It defines pastiche by the relation between the later work and the earlier protected work: the later work must evoke the earlier one, remain noticeably different from it, and use its characteristic features to enter into recognisable artistic or creative dialogue with it. Pastiche exists where the later work speaks to the earlier one.
This post argues that Pelham II is not merely a judgment about sampling, nor even merely a clarification of a neglected copyright exception. It is a judgment about the conditions under which copying becomes culture. By making recognisable artistic or creative dialogue the criterion for pastiche, the Court turns Article 5(3)(k) of Directive 2001/29 into a constitutional safety valve for artistic reuse. Nevertheless, that move comes at a price: the Court protects remix, homage, collage and quotation-like practices from a permission-only model of culture, but it does so by asking courts to decide whether a new work has entered into dialogue with an old one. In other words, Pelham II does not simply ask whether copying occurred; it asks whether copying spoke.
From a Short Sample to a Difficult Exception
The Court’s first major intervention in the long-running Pelham litigation came in Pelham and Others, where it held that taking even a very short sound sample from a phonogram may fall within the phonogram producer’s reproduction right where the sample remains recognisable to the ear. At the same time, the Court accepted that sampling may be a form of artistic expression protected by Article 13 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, read together with the broader freedom of expression protected by Article 11 of the Charter (Pelham and Others, paras 33-35).
That first judgment created a curious predicament for follow-on creators. If a sample is altered beyond recognition, it may escape the reproduction right; however, if the sample remains recognisable, precisely because recognition is the artistic point of the borrowing, the user enters the terrain of infringement unless an exception applies. In that sense, recognisability became both the aesthetic reason for sampling and the juridical reason for vulnerability. The very feature that allows a listener to perceive reference, homage, quotation, irony or memory is also the feature that may trigger liability.
The usual exceptions did not fit comfortably. Quotation under Article 5(3)(d) of Directive 2001/29 is conceptually awkward where the borrowing does not cite the earlier work for purposes such as criticism or review, and where its expressive force lies less in citing a source than in reworking a recognisable cultural fragment. Parody, after Deckmyn, requires evocation of an existing work while being noticeably different from it, but it also implies humour or mockery (Deckmyn, para. 20). Much sampling, however, is neither scholarly citation nor comic ridicule, since it may operate instead as homage, atmosphere, texture, cultural memory, genre-play, or what might be called musical address. Pastiche therefore arrives as the neglected sibling of caricature and parody: not a general licence to remix, but a narrower space for overt, differentiated and non-comic reuse whose point is creative dialogue rather than criticism, review or ridicule. Without that space, a permission-only model of copyright would impose a prior authorisation requirement on cultural reference itself, allowing proprietary control to reach not only acts of substitution or commercial exploitation, but also the ordinary traffic of cultural memory.
Pastiche as an Anti-Permission Principle
Since Directive 2001/29 does not define “pastiche” and does not refer the meaning of the term to the laws of the Member States, the Court treats it as an autonomous concept of EU law requiring uniform interpretation (Pelham II, para. 34). This repeats the logic of Deckmyn, where parody was similarly treated as an autonomous EU concept, and it matters because pastiche is not left to the separate histories of national copyright traditions, nor to the accidental distribution of aesthetic vocabulary across Member States. It becomes part of a common EU grammar for lawful cultural reuse.
The Court recognises that ordinary language does not yield a clean answer. Pastiche may refer to imitation of another artist’s style, but it may also refer more generally to a work composed through the borrowing and recombination of elements from earlier works; some understandings involve concealed imitation, while others involve an overt and recognisable relationship with a pre-existing work (Pelham II, paras 35-38). Because the word itself is unstable, the Court turns to context and purpose. Pastiche appears in Article 5(3)(k) beside caricature and parody, from which the Court derives a common core: all three concepts involve evoking an existing work while remaining noticeably different from it (Pelham II, para. 40). Yet pastiche cannot require humour, mockery or satire, because that would collapse it into parody or caricature; conversely, it cannot cover every noticeably different evocation of an old work, because that would render its neighbours redundant (Pelham II, paras 42-43).
The resulting formula is deliberately poised. Pastiche is not confined to comic distortion; nor is it an Auffangtatbestand, a catch-all category for all creative borrowing (Pelham II, para. 44). It requires the use of characteristic features of the earlier work in order to enter into recognisable artistic or creative dialogue with it (Pelham II, paras 50-58). That is the doctrinal hinge of the judgment. The Court does not define pastiche by reference to the defendant’s inner intention, the genre of the later work, the amount taken, or the presence of humour. It defines it relationally. Pastiche exists where the later work speaks to the earlier one.
This relational definition quietly performs an anti-permission function. The Court anchors Article 5(3)(k) in a fair balance between copyright and related rights, on the one hand, and the interests and fundamental rights of users, including freedom of expression and freedom of the arts under Articles 11 and 13 of the Charter, on the other (Pelham II, paras 45-48). That approach is consistent with the Court’s earlier insistence in Funke Medien NRW and Spiegel Online that exceptions and limitations under Directive 2001/29 are not merely grudging derogations from copyright, but may themselves give concrete expression to fundamental freedoms.
This matters because much modern culture is intertextual. Music samples, memes quote, visual art recombines, fashion alludes, digital video cuts and loops, while political speech often borrows familiar cultural signs precisely because they are familiar. In such practices, recognisability is not an accident to be minimised; it is often the very condition of meaning. A permission-only model of copyright would therefore impose a prior authorisation requirement on cultural reference itself, allowing proprietary control to reach not only acts of substitution or commercial exploitation, but also the ordinary traffic of cultural memory. Pelham II resists that conclusion, not by creating a general right to remix, and not by excusing plagiarism or concealed imitation, which the Court expressly excludes (Pelham II, para. 49), but by recognising that certain acts of overt, differentiated and dialogic reuse belong within the domain of lawful creativity.
The Uneasy Test of Artistic Dialogue
The phrase “artistic or creative dialogue” does the real work of the judgment, because it marks a shift from copying as talking to copying as conversation. The Court accepts that the pastiche exception must be capable, to some extent, of covering the use of protected elements; otherwise, Article 5(3)(k) would be deprived of useful effect (Pelham II, paras 52-53). But the protected element must be used in a particular way: it must be characteristic of the earlier work, and its presence in the later work must enable a recognisable creative relation between the two (Pelham II, paras 50-58). The exception therefore does not protect copying as such. It protects copying that functions as an address.
The second question referred to the Court exposes the fragile part of this approach. Must the user have intended to create a pastiche, or is objective recognisability enough? The Court chooses the latter, holding that, in the interests of legal certainty, the pastiche character must be assessed objectively and must be recognisable to persons familiar with the work from which the material has been borrowed (Pelham II, para. 61). It is therefore sufficient that the pastiche nature be recognisable to such a person (Pelham II, para. 62). The choice is understandable, because a subjective intention requirement would invite strategic declarations and force courts to litigate motive, sincerity and artistic self-description. Yet the Court’s solution does not eliminate subjectivity. It relocates subjectivity to an imagined cultured observer.
Who is this observer? The Court speaks of a person familiar with the existing work, but familiarity with the source is not the same as literacy in the practice of reuse. There is a loose resemblance here to legal standards that use a hypothetical informed person, including patent law’s skilled person, but the Pelham II observer is not being asked to understand a technical claim; she is being asked to recognise an artistic relation. One may know Kraftwerk and fail to understand sampling; one may identify a borrowed sound and yet miss its place within hip-hop, electronic music, club culture, internet vernacular or postmodern collage. Conversely, members of a subculture may hear dialogue where an ordinary listener hears only repetition, and may perceive irony, homage, violence or affection in a borrowed fragment that appears inert to judicial ears. The risk, then, is not that Pelham II gives courts too much freedom in the abstract, but that courts may mistake recognisability for respectability.
The deeper implication is that Pelham II constitutionalises aesthetics. The Court does not only ask national courts to decide whether a protected element has been taken, whether the later work is noticeably different, or whether the use affects the rightsholder’s interests. It asks them to decide whether the relation between the two works amounts to artistic or creative dialogue. That is not wholly new: originality, as interpreted in Infopaq International, Painer, and Levola Hengelo, already requires courts to assess intellectual creation and identifiable subject matter, while parody after Deckmyn requires an assessment of evocation, difference and fair balance. Nevertheless, Pelham II intensifies the problem, since it does not ask merely whether the old work can be perceived, but what the new work is doing with that perception.
Applying Pelham II in National Courts
Because Pelham II leaves the final application of Article 5(3)(k) to national courts, its practical force will depend on how they give content to the judgment’s own limits. The Court’s formulation requires recognisable artistic or creative dialogue, noticeable difference from the earlier work, and a fair balance between copyright protection and the freedoms protected by Articles 11 and 13 of the Charter. It also expressly refuses to treat pastiche as a catch-all defence for all artistic borrowing. Against that background, three points should guide national courts.
First, “dialogue” should be treated as a modest threshold of perceivable creative relation, not as an examination in artistic merit. The relevant question should not be whether the later work is beautiful, sophisticated, original in an elevated sense, or persuasive as art criticism; it should be whether the work objectively places the earlier work in a relation of reference, transformation, answer, tribute, irony, critique, stylistic play or other creative engagement. Courts may decide whether a dialogue exists. They should not decide whether it is a good dialogue.
Second, the imagined observer should be genre-sensitive rather than culturally generic. A person familiar with Kraftwerk is not necessarily a person familiar with sampling, just as a person familiar with a painting may not understand meme culture or digital collage. Accordingly, national courts should ask whether the dialogic relation would be recognisable to a reasonably informed audience within the relevant artistic or cultural practice, not merely to a judicially imagined average consumer of the source work. This would preserve the objective character of the test while avoiding the false neutrality of an observer who, in practice, may reproduce mainstream aesthetic assumptions.
Third, the fair balance inquiry should remain genuinely bilateral. Pastiche cannot become an all-purpose defence for creative appropriation, since the Court expressly denies it any catch-all nature and excludes plagiarism or concealed imitation (Pelham II, paras 49 and 58). However, the rightsholder’s interest should not be understood as a veto over recognisable reference merely because the borrowed element remains perceptible. Where the later work is noticeably different, where the borrowed element is used to produce an intelligible relation with the earlier work, and where the use does not operate as a market substitute, Article 5(3)(k) should be allowed to do real work. Otherwise, pastiche will remain a decorative exception: ceremonially recognised, but rarely useful.
Conclusion
There is a strange disproportion at the heart of Pelham II. A two-second sample has required the Court to say something large about the life of culture under EU copyright law. The Court’s answer is careful: pastiche covers not all borrowing, but borrowing that evokes, differs and converses. That answer deserves approval, but not unqualified applause. It gives Article 5(3)(k) real work to do; it prevents copyright from becoming a permission machine for every recognisable cultural reference; and it recognises that art is not made only by originality in isolation, but also by memory, citation, distortion and reply. In that sense, Pelham II is a necessary corrective to an impoverished conception of authorship, one in which every trace of another work appears as a proprietary trespass rather than as part of culture’s ordinary traffic.
Nevertheless, the judgment’s elegance conceals its burden. “Recognisable artistic or creative dialogue” is a demanding phrase. Applied generously, it can protect the ordinary intertextuality of modern culture; applied anxiously, it can turn judges into curators of acceptable reuse. The future of pastiche after Pelham II will therefore depend on whether courts treat dialogue as a modest threshold of perceivable creative relation, or as an aesthetic examination that only legally legible art can pass. The Court has not said that copying is culture. It has said something narrower, and more interesting: sometimes, copying speaks. The task now is to ensure that EU copyright law learns to hear more than one kind of voice.
