By Oliver Garner
Update (21/02/2018; 19:00 CET): On 20th February 2017, an appeal to the ‘intention’ of the District Court to refer questions to the Court of Justice of the European Union was admitted. The Dutch government and the Municipality of Amsterdam now have three weeks within which to appeal.
Introduction: A New Route from Amsterdam to Luxembourg.
A Brief Chronology of the Relevant Facts and Sources for the Amsterdam Case.
A Summary of the Amsterdam District Court Decision.
Legal Analysis of the Questions Referred: The Arguments for and against Automatic extinction and a Potential Compromise.
Conclusion: The Ramifications of Emancipative Legal Constitutionalism.
Introduction: A New Route from Amsterdam to Luxembourg
Despite the United Kingdom’s impending withdrawal from the European Union, a direct Eurostar train route from London to Amsterdam will soon be established. This route will enable, amongst others, all of those holding the status and rights of EU citizenship to move ‘freely’ between the two metropolises. This class still includes nationals of the United Kingdom, and ostensibly will continue to do until that Member State’s withdrawal is concluded in accordance with Article 50 TEU. An incorporeal yet no less direct route has now also been established between Amsterdam and Luxembourg as a result of a preliminary reference by the Rechtbank Amsterdam (‘District Court’) to the European Court of Justice (‘ECJ’) under Article 267 TFEU. Such a judicial pathway may facilitate retention of the status and rights created by Article 9 TEU and Article 20 TFEU for the aforementioned nationals of the withdrawing state. Continue reading
The 20th century has witnessed an impressive rise of constitutional justice, in particular as regards the emergence of and role given to constitutional courts in many European countries and the CJEU at the supranational level. A lot of literature has covered aspects of this development, and in the academic debate several authors have also voiced criticism of this court-centred constitutionalism and academic obsession with courts. This can be seen e.g. in the recent issue of the German Law Journal which features a number of contributions on the Political Constitution as a counter movement. In this rich context, Maartje de Visser examines two questions in her book Constitutional Review in Europe: First, who should uphold the Constitution, and second, how is constitutional review organised? In an attempt to answer these questions, she scrutinizes the legal order of 11 European countries and the EU legal order. In this post, I will first briefly set out the structure and content of the book in some more detail, before offering some praise and criticism. Continue reading