The recent judgment of the Court of Justice in the so-called Union Values case (C‑769/22 Commission v Hungary) has attracted considerable attention because it marks the first direct judicial enforcement of Article 2 TEU – a development which constitutes another “constitutional moment” for the European Union. Yet the substantive issue at the heart of the case, namely the prohibition of LGBTI content, has received comparatively limited attention.
This relative neglect is partly due to a widespread assumption that the Hungarian legislation at issue was straightforwardly incompatible with European human rights standards. That assumption had solid foundations. Hungary’s so-called “Child Protection Law” sought to prevent what was described the “promotion” and “portrayal” of homosexuality, transgenderism and gender reassignment to minors. To that end, the core of the legislation prohibited such content in childcare services, advertising, and public education (although in the case of public education only its “promotion” was singled out). Additionally, any audiovisual product containing such content was labelled as non-recommended for minors and could only be broadcast between 22:00 and 5:00 am.
By the time Hungary adopted this law in 2021, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) had already condemned analogous Russian legislation — which had inspired Orbán’s majority — for prohibiting the “promotion of non-traditional sexual relations” to minors (Bayev v Russia, 2017). In 2023, while the Union Values case was pending before the Court of Justice, Strasbourg largely reaffirmed that position in a judgment concerning the suspension and compulsory labelling of children’s fairy tale books containing LGBTI characters and relationships as unsuitable for children under 14, despite being intended for readers aged 9–10 (Macatė v Lithuania). The enactment of such legislation also follows a recognisable pattern in illiberal politics: targeting LGBTI rights and gender issues precisely in order to provoke reactions from international and supranational institutions, which can then be reframed as external interference with national sovereignty (Malagodi and Stradella). Orbán pursued this strategy (here and here), though given the (deliberate?) timing of the publication of the Union Values judgment after the most recent national elections in Hungary, the question of implementation will now fall to his successor.
The Court of Justice ultimately found that the legislation breached several internal market provisions, the principle of non-discrimination, the rights to private and family life, freedom of expression, and the protection of human dignity — violations that also constituted breaches of the values of equality, dignity, and respect for human rights enshrined in Article 2 TEU. Despite this convergence in outcome, a comparison between Bayev, Macatė, and the Union Values case reveals both the extent of the CJEU’s transformation into a human rights court and the limits of that transformation.
The Structural Constraints: The Scope of EU Law
The CJEU’s transformation into a human rights court remains constrained by the scope of EU law. The Charter of Fundamental Rights applies to Member States only when they are “implementing Union law” (Article 51(1) of the Charter), whereas the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) applies whenever the right in question is engaged. In Bayev and Macatė, the ECtHR needed only to establish that the bans interfered with freedom of expression: the fines imposed on demonstrators (Bayev, para. 62), the suspension of publication (Macatė, para. 180), and the broader chilling effect of the legislation (Macatė, para. 182) were all sufficient to trigger Article 10 ECHR.
In the Union Values case, by contrast, the Commission in bringing its case and then the Court of Justice first had to identify an “anchoring mechanism” linking the Hungarian legislation to EU law and thereby to the Charter. The chosen vector was, as is often the case, the internal market. To bring the market provisions to bear, the Court relied on a series of expansive interpretations. It read the notion of “economic activity” broadly, with the mere possibility of services provided against remuneration sometimes sufficing to trigger applicability even where public operators were involved (paras. 270, 296 and 339). The Court also relied extensively on the “market access” approach, under which any national measure rendering the exercise of market freedoms “less attractive” may constitute a restriction — enabling the application of Directive 2000/31 and 2006/123 as well as Article 56 TFEU, even to measures whose connection to cross-border economic activity was often tenuous (paras. 281, 351 and 370). Where this remained insufficient — notably for public education, which normally falls outside the scope of market freedoms under the Humbel doctrine — the Court shifted its perspective and focused instead on the potential participation of external providers within public schools, pulling the matter back within the scope of EU law (para. 394).
The direct judicial enforcement of Article 2 TEU does not appear, at least for now, to fundamentally alter this structure. Advocate General Čapeta had explicitly distinguished “self-standing” enforcement of Article 2 TEU within the scope of EU law from “autonomous” enforcement capable of extending beyond it (Čapeta, para. 32). The Court grounded the breaches of values in prior breaches of EU law (Union Values, paras. 547–548), and added that “an interpretation that goes beyond [this] would be liable to deprive the limits imposed on the scope of other provisions of EU law, and, in particular, the provisions of the Charter, which, pursuant to Article 51(1) thereof, are addressed to the Member States only when they are implementing Union law, of all effectiveness” (Union Values, para. 550). This appears to confine the review of Article 2 TEU to the existing scope of the acquis — though the question of whether Article 2 might eventually justify review beyond the traditional limits of EU competences remains open, and with it the extent of protection for LGBTI individuals in similar purely domestic situations.
For instance, from a substantive point of view, Hungary’s 2025 ban on Pride demonstrations appears to be contrary to the values of Article 2 TEU as well (Uitz, Renáta). However, whether such a ban falls within the scope of EU law remains uncertain. Would market provisions on services be applicable, given that EU nationals may want to provide services during the event? Or travel to Hungary to participate (which some did)? What about the prosecution of Budapest’s mayor for holding this event? The Hungarian Supreme Court relied on the absence of a true cross-border element not to send a request for a preliminary ruling to the Court of Justice (para. 23), a decision probably motivated by a desire to avoid European scrutiny, but one whose ground has some merits. The Commission itself declared that it might undertake measures on the basis of the AI Act and unspecified “privacy rules” due to the Hungarian government’s intention to employ facial recognition technology to identify demonstrators. The Union Values judgment therefore does not solve the structural asymmetry between the foundationality of EU values and the difficulty for EU law and institutions to uphold them. The choice will often remain whether to stretch the EU’s constitutional structure, often at the risk of legitimising a catch-all market, or to delegate protection to what remains a partially external system, the ECHR.
Deliberate Differences: Non-Discrimination and Dignity
Another significant difference between the two European courts, the CJEU and the ECtHR, lies in their choice of primary fundamental right. The Court of Justice placed non-discrimination at the centre of its analysis in Union Values; the ECtHR focused primarily on freedom of expression in Bayev and almost exclusively so in Macatė.
In the Union Values judgment, the prohibition of discrimination informed all of the breaches of market provisions, either through Article 21 of the Charter (paras. 129–163, 195–197, 306–310 and 412–415) or, in one case, because the market instrument directly contained the prohibition of discrimination (namely Article 9(1)(c)(ii) of Directive 2010/13; paras. 227–235). The analysis reflects a “content-based” approach: the legislation is discriminatory because of the message it conveys. The difference in treatment between LGBTI and non-LGBTI content (Union Values, para. 135) reveals a “preference” (para. 136) that undermines the “essence” of the right (para. 141) and which therefore cannot be justified under any circumstances (para. 142). This finding was confirmed by the violation of Article 1 of the Charter, since the right to human dignity is of an absolute character. It is also worth noting that Article 21 of the Charter can operate autonomously in a way that Article 14 ECHR cannot, which partly explains the structural divergence between the two courts.
In contrast, there is some reluctance in Strasbourg to engage directly with the principle of non-discrimination. In Bayev, the ECtHR did examine discrimination claims and found a violation of Article 14 ECHR for essentially the same reasons as Article 10 ECHR (paras. 89–91). Yet in Macatė, the Grand Chamber declined to examine the Article 14 claim separately, considering the matter sufficiently addressed through freedom of expression alone (para. 221). As in other LGBTI rights cases (see Fedotova, para. 230), the likely reason is strategic. Macatė does address the discriminatory dimension of the Lithuanian legislation by finding that it was based on a “preference” for heterosexual orientation (para. 215) but, as the dissenting judges noted, the Court stops short of clarifying whether Article 14 is engaged because of discrimination against LGBTI content, rather than because of the sexual orientation or gender identity of the rightsholder.
The Principled Rejection of LGBTI “Bans”
Both courts did converge in condemning such bans as unlawful in principle, whether framed through freedom of expression or non-discrimination.
The ECtHR held that the bans did not pursue any “legitimate aim” capable of justifying the interference with fundamental rights (Bayev, para. 83; Macatė, para. 216). This is a notably severe finding: in most cases, the Court either accepts a government’s stated aim and opts to condemn on grounds of legal basis or proportionality. Denying legitimacy outright forecloses any future proportionality assessment and signals a categorical exclusion of similar legislation.
The Court of Justice reached a comparable outcome through the “essence” doctrine. Article 52(1) of the Charter requires that any limitation on a conditional right must “respect the essence” of that right. It is a technique drawn from German constitutional law (Lock) which the ECtHR has used since one of its first judgements (Belgian Linguistic Case) although not always with clarity (Van Drooghenbroeck and Rizcallah), which might explain why it did not refer to it in the LGBTI ban cases. Because the Hungarian legislation established a difference in treatment between LGBTI and non-LGBTI content that undermined the very essence of the principle of non-discrimination (para. 141) it could not be justified under any circumstances (para. 142). This conclusion was reinforced by the absolute character of the right to human dignity under Article 1 of the Charter.
Conflict of Rights and the Construction of a European Understanding of LGBTI Representation
Furthermore, one of the most striking convergences between the two courts is their shared approach to the role of LGBTI representation for minors in a democratic society — a European understanding that diverges sharply from the position recently articulated in the United States.
Both courts recognised that protecting minors constitutes a legitimate objective (Union Values, para. 244; Macatė, para. 204) and acknowledged the particular “impressionability” (Macatė, para. 205) or “degree of sensitivity resulting from their age” (Union Values, para. 145) of children. They nevertheless agreed that the mere portrayal or positive depiction of LGBTI identities is not harmful to children (Union Values, para. 147). The ECtHR went further, explicitly holding that exposure to LGBTI content may in fact protect children from homophobia (Bayev, para. 82; Macatė, para. 210) — an argument advanced by the Commission (Union Values, para. 100) but not expressly endorsed by the Court of Justice.
Pluralism and the Limits of Rights and Convictions of Parents
Both courts grounded their reasoning in the right to education under Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 ECHR and Article 14(3) of the Charter. Parental rights, they held, are not absolute: parental preferences cannot be given “automatic priority in every situation, particularly outside school” (Bayev, para. 81; Union Values, para. 151). Such preferences must instead be “balanced” against criteria of “objectivity, pluralism, scientific accuracy and, ultimately, the usefulness of a particular type of information to the young audience” (Bayev, para. 82; Union Values, para. 151). Crucially, neither court accepted that the bans actually served parental rights: both held that parents were not “diminished” by the existence of LGBTI content in the public sphere, since they remained free to pass on their own beliefs to their children (Bayev, para. 82; Union Values, para. 154). The Court of Justice went further, holding that it was the prohibition itself that deprived parents of freedom of choice in the education and teaching of their children (Union Values, para. 153).
The contrast with the US Supreme Court’s recent decision in Mahmoud v. Taylor is illuminating. Like the European courts, the majority recognised that the books at issue exposed children to “a particular viewpoint” and were “unmistakably normative” — presenting same-sex marriage “as a cause for celebration” or implying that denying gender transition is harmful (Mahmoud v. Taylor, p. 25). Yet where the European courts treated this normativity as an unremarkable feature of pluralist education, the majority on the US Supreme Court deduced from it the existence of a “burden” on parents’ constitutional right to free exercise of religion, thereby triggering strict scrutiny and ultimately requiring an opt-out right. The dissent, by contrast, characterised the situation as mere “exposure” to ideas with which some parents disagreed (Sotomayor J., dissenting, p. 30) — a framing much closer to the European position. Most strikingly, the non-discrimination of LGBTI persons was not seriously advanced as a legitimate basis for limiting parental religious freedom, either by the defendant school, the majority or the dissent.
Conclusion
The CJEU’s Union Values judgment is significant not only as a constitutional milestone in the enforcement of Article 2 TEU, but as a substantive contribution to the development of LGBTI rights in European law. Read alongside the ECtHR’s Bayev and Macatė, it reveals a broadly shared European understanding: that LGBTI representation does not harm children, that parental preferences do not automatically prevail in the public sphere, and that legislation premised on the inferiority of LGBTI identities cannot be saved by proportionality review. Most differences between the two European courts — in jurisdictional structure, in the choice between non-discrimination and freedom of expression, and in the avoidance of difficult questions about same-sex unions — are real, but they are differences of method rather than of outcome.
That European convergence, and its divergence from the current direction of US constitutional law, may prove consequential at a time where LGBTI rights appear to be under threat. Yet the convergence has a ceiling. The potential of the CJEU as a human rights court, and of EU law as a source of protection of rights, remains impaired by the division of competences within the EU and the restrictive scope of the Charter, which the current interpretation of Article 2 TEU does not alter (and should it?). This leaves the Court of Justice with two choices: to expand the field of other EU norms, especially the market, which may raise constitutional and legitimacy issues of its own, or to leave protection to other instruments such as, precisely, the ECHR. In that sense, the dilemma coincides with the debate around the enforcement of Article 2 TEU and highlights, once again, the paradox between the foundational nature of the Union’s values and its limited ability to protect them.
