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Paying With Data? The CJEU to Decide What ‘Free’ Really Means


When companies advertise their online services as ‘free’ while collecting and commercially exploiting consumer data, should such advertising be considered as misleading under European consumer law? In September 2025, Germany’s highest jurisdiction in civil matters, the Bundesgerichtshof (BGH), stayed its proceedings and referred this question on the interpretation of the 2005 Unfair Commercial Practices Directive to the CJEU.

At first glance, it might seem like a trivial and narrow question. This blog post, however, contextualises and explores the broader significance of the referral – both for the European consumer law framework and for the EU’s ambiguous and, at times, incoherent approach to the regulation of the data economy. While individuals are protected through the fundamental right to data protection (Article 8 CFREU) which rejects the commodification of personal data, the European legal order must simultaneously contend with the economic reality that companies derive substantial value from the commercial exploitation of consumer data.

Contradictions in the EU’s regulatory approach to the data economy have become increasingly apparent since the regulation of data is no longer confined to the European data protection framework but extends across multiple legal domains, including consumer law. Whereas consumer and data protection law might seem like a natural fit in jointly safeguarding consumers online, this blog post explains why their relationship is far from straightforward. To this date, EU consumer law offers little guidance on how it interacts with the regulation of consumer data while being ‘without prejudice’ to European data protection law.

Furthermore, this post outlines possible outcomes of the BGH referral and how the CJEU might bring greater clarity. Ultimately, however, it argues that the Court’s judicial activism can only go so far in untangling this regulatory quagmire, and that genuine coherence requires a legislative update of the European consumer law acquis, which remains firmly rooted in the analogue era.

 

Paying with Consumer Data and the Ambiguous Relationship between European Consumer and Data Protection Law

Over the past 10 years, scholars have increasingly argued that an integrated approach from data and consumer protection law would be essential to regulate the digital economy, offering more complete protection in modern markets. Yet, up to this day, their relationship remains ambiguous. This ambiguity largely stems from their divergent rationales: European data protection law, grounded in fundamental rights, focuses on the fair processing of personal data, while European consumer law primarily safeguards consumers’ economic interests and ensures fair market transactions. Although both aim to address power imbalances between parties, their objectives do not necessarily align.

For a long time, their different rationales were of no concern. The regulation of data was confined to European data protection law, whereas European consumer law was strongly rooted in and confined to the analogue world. Core instruments such as the 1993 Unfair Contract Terms Directive and the 2005 Unfair Commercial Practices Directive were not designed to protect consumers in digital markets. With the rise of Big Data and the realization that supposedly ‘free’ online services extract significant commercial value from user data, this disconnect became impossible to ignore. Most famously, Zubhoff in her landmark book on the Age of Surveillance Capitalism wrote how consumers became the objects ‘from which raw materials are extracted and expropriated for Google’s prediction factories’. European consumer law and its focus on analogue market transactions was clearly ill-equipped to address these new data-driven business models.

When the European Commission announced plans to adapt the EU consumer acquis to the digital age, its first initiative revealed how consumer and data protection law cannot only complement but also fundamentally contradict each other. With a 2015 proposal, the Commission intended to ensure that consumers are not only protected when they pay for digital content and services with money, but also when providing their data as ‘counter-performance’. The proposal thus intended to openly recognise personal data as a form of payment – a concept fundamentally at odds with the inalienable nature of the fundamental right to data protection. In reaction, the European Data Protection Supervisor strongly condemned the proposal, comparing markets for personal data with markets for live human organs that should never receive the blessing of legislation. From a data protection perspective, personal data should not be treated as a commodity, and the protection of fundamental rights should not be reduced to simple consumer interests. Complementarity certainly sounds different.

The proposal eventually was adopted as the 2019 Digital Content and Services Directive. Instead of using the term ‘counter-performance’, the Directive highlights that it applies to contracts where compagnies offer digital services, and consumers provide personal data, awkwardly trying to sidestep any accusation that it might recognise consumer data as a form payment. A rather unsatisfactory solution that fails to conceal the Directive’s initial intent and, instead, reflects a continuity in the EU’s approach to the regulation of the data economy that ignores the elephant in the room, i.e. the tension between the fundamental right to data protection and the promotion of the data economy. The 2019 Digital Content Directive masks this tension behind declaratory statements such as ‘personal data is not a commodity’ and that it applies ‘without prejudice’ to the GDPR. The first EU consumer law instrument to explicitly address the regulation of consumer data thus revealed how its market-transaction logic conflicts with the fundamental rights logic underpinning EU data protection law — yet it stopped short of confronting and resolving these underlying tensions.

The Unfair Commercial Practices Directive and ‘Free’ Content and Services in the Digital Economy

When companies advertise their digital services as free while extensively collecting and exploiting consumer data, should this raise concerns under consumer or data protection law? From a data protection perspective that rejects any notion of ‘paying with data’, this advertising does not seem problematic. Yet, under EU consumer law, and particularly the 2005 Unfair Commercial Practices Directive, companies are prohibited from misleading consumers, including by advertising products as ‘free’ when consumers must in fact pay (see Annex I, point 20). When Facebook long used the slogan ‘It’s free and always will be’ could that be misleading under EU consumer law?

This question has divided authorities across Member States. In Italy, the competition authority (AGCM) investigated Facebook following complaints from consumer associations. Facebook argued that consumer law did not apply, as only data protection law as lex specialis should govern issues related to the regulation of personal data. Referring to the European Data Protection Supervisor’s earlier statement that personal data is not a commodity, Facebook claimed that consumer law, with its focus on market transactions, should be irrelevant in that context. An argument that was certainly disingenuous, coming from a company that built its wealth on the commercial exploitation of consumer data and sought to tailor its defence to the very contradictions within the EU’s regulatory framework.

The AGCM rejected Facebook’s defence but did not ban the “free” slogan. It found the advertising misleading not because the service was labelled “free,” but because users were not informed that their data would be used for commercial purposes beyond the social media service. Facebook was therefore required to add more information, not to withdraw the claim. The Italian Council of State confirmed this approach in 2021.

In Germany, a similar case was brought by a consumer association before the Regional Court Berlin in 2018. Facebook did not contest the application of consumer law. In Germany, courts had already held in 2013 that Facebook was certainly not donating its services to consumers and that, accordingly, consumer law applied. Unlike the Italian competition authority, however, the German Regional Court held that Facebook’s advertising was not misleading. It reasoned that the term ‘cost’ in the 2005 Unfair Commercial Practices Directive referred only to economic or financial burdens. The provision of personal data, it argued, would only affect immaterial interests such as informational self-determination and should therefore fall outside the Directive’s scope. The ‘average consumer’ according to the court, would understand this distinction.

Seven years later, the case has now reached Germany’s highest civil court, the Bundesgerichtshof (BGH). The BGH questioned whether this interpretation was correct. It doubted that it was obvious what the notion of ‘cost’ covers and whether it might extend to the disclosure and commercial exploitation of personal data. The BGH noted that other EU instruments explicitly refer to personal data as de facto remuneration for electronic communication services such as WhatsApp (see recital 16 of the European Electronic Communications Code) or, as would be the case in the above-mentioned 2019 Digital Content Directive, regard the provision of personal data as equivalent to monetary payments. Against this background, the BGH has now stayed the proceedings and referred the following question to the CJEU:

Does the term ‘cost’ within the meaning of the 2005 Unfair Commercial Practices Directive cover the disclosure and subsequent commercial exploitation of personal data?

European Consumer Law’s Future Role in Regulating the Digital Economy

How might the CJEU decide? Three main scenarios seem possible.

First, the Court may follow the 2018 decision of the German Regional Court and hold that the term ‘cost’ in the current form of the 2005 Unfair Commercial Practices Directive does not extend to situations where consumers provide access to their data.

Second, it may disagree and find that ‘cost’ also covers instances where consumers consent to the collection and use of their data but without specifying the legal consequences of such a broader interpretation. In that case, the ‘Italian option’ could prevail: companies may still advertise their services as free provided they simultaneously inform consumers that their data will be for commercial purposes.

Third, the Court may adopt the more far-reaching view than both of the conclusions reached at the national level. It could find that companies should be prohibited from marketing their services as free where personal data constitutes a form of counter-performance.

From a consumer policy perspective that strives towards a ‘high level of consumer protection’ in the Union, the last option would be the most convincing. As the German BGH has underlined in its reference to the CJEU, falsely advertising a product as ‘free’ is expressly prohibited under the 2005 Unfair Commercial Practices since ‘free’ offers have a particularly strong appeal to consumers. Furthermore, describing services as ‘free’ where consumer data serves as counter-performance conceals the data’s economic value and undermines informed consumer choice. The solution required by the Italian authorities – simply adding more text to clarify a slogan that is misleading by itself – clearly does not seem satisfactory from a consumer protection perspective.

Importantly, prohibiting the use of ‘free’ in such contexts would not amount to legally recognising ‘paying with data’ or attaching to it the same legal consequences as monetary payments. Any such recognition would, in fact, conflict with the GDPR’s notion of freely given consent, which can be withdrawn at any time—unlike monetary payments that, once made, cannot be simply revoked in all cases. The aim would be to prevent companies from misleading consumers about the economic reality of data-driven business models, not to fully equate the disclosure of personal data with financial transactions.

At the same time, however, one may question whether such a more extensive and consumer-friendly interpretation should emerge through judicial activism by the CJEU, or whether it is for the European legislator to update and clarify consumer law instruments to the digital era. In its current form, the 2005 Unfair Commercial Practices Directive makes no reference to whether and how it applies to commercial practices involving the processing of consumer data, nor to its relationship with the European data protection framework. A legislative update, however, could potentially come in the not-too-distant future in form of the Digital Fairness Act. The former constitutes a response to the 2022 Fitness Check on digital fairness which examined three consumer law instruments (including the 2005 Unfair Commercial Practices Directive) and concluded that the current framework would be insufficient to ensure fairness in digital markets and risks losing relevance without reform.

It is the Digital Fairness Act which could provide the long-awaited opportunity to clarify how consumer law can remain effective in protecting consumers in the digital sphere and how it interacts with data protection law with regard to the regulation of consumer data. Such clarification should go beyond the recurring formula that consumer law applies ‘without prejudice to the GDPR’. It should incorporate lessons from the 2019 Digital Content Directive (and other more recent digital laws) which, beyond such declaratory statements, did not clarify the relationship between consumer and data protection law and their contrasting cores. It should instead articulate how distinct legal regimes, one grounded in the protection of fundamental rights, the other in ensuring fair market transactions, can coherently operate together in the regulation of consumer data. Data that is, at once, protected as a fundamental right and exploited as a commercial asset.

Delegating these questions to national lawmakers or simply leaving them unresolved inevitably results in legal fragmentation, as illustrated by the divergent approaches taken by the German and Italian authorities discussed above. The BGH’s referral to the CJEU thus epitomises both the uncertainty and the contradictions embedded in the EU’s current approach to regulating the data economy. The future CJEU decision, though only one piece of the broader puzzle, may nonetheless become a building block in defining what a high level of consumer protection means in the data-driven economy—and in clarifying how European consumer law can meaningfully complement data protection law in the digital age.

Cite this post (OSCOLA)

O Hinrichs, 'Paying With Data? The CJEU to Decide What ‘Free’ Really Means' (European Law Blog, 30 October 2025) doi:10.21428/9885764c.84bb58ec accessed 7 November 2026.